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lN'rRODUCTIOl.J"

•

J t'

An intelligent understanding of international relation-

ships requires a special study of the critical places where
continuous crisis arises.

It was felt, therefore, desirable

to exa mine a significant aspect of the conflict between the
.A ~ab ':!orld and the State of Israel that provides the subject

of this study.

..

.

'fhe economic boycott of Israel

ms

assumed a Grave

significance in interna tional relations, yet to the author's
knowledge this subject has not been investigated in a
scholarly and comprehensive mam1er in any available publication.

•J

'l 1he writer embarks on this topic in the hope that

it may provide the American student of

'

~1iddle

Eastern

affairs with the essential data for its clear understanding.
When

t~e

Arab boycott started officially, in 1950,

most of the Hestern authorities tended to regard it as of
minor importance.

Its wider significance was brought home

to them, when in April, 1960, American longshor~men. refus~d
to ur1load the United Arab Republic passenger-cargo ship

2
11

Cleopatra 11 at Hew York harbor.*

In response, harbor workers

throughout the Arab World, refused to unload any American
s hips a t their seaports.
t hreatened to

This double boycott naturally

provoke ~~ension

between .the ·Arab

and

~tates

the United Sta tes, indicating the dangerous international
re percus sions of the
It s e ems

~ rab

boycott of Israel.

obvious . ~h at

the problem of Ar a b-Isre aeli

r e l a tion s should be of some relevance to the American
student of international relations.
g re ~t

The United States has

economic , strategic, and politica l interests in the

Arab world, supposedly one of the na tura l defence outposts
of .Jestern democracy.
while the usua l books and periodicals ha ve bee n
us ed in prepa ration of the present study, the ma in source
materia l wa s provided by United Na tions docume nts and ,
part icularly, orig ina l documents in Arabic

em~~a ting

from

the various authorities directing the boycott and
~navailable

in English.

Besides t hese a nd other Ara bic

ma terial, documents from Israeli s ources, too, have been
u sed.

\ihile 1 t is not cla i med that t h is surve y is

e xha ustive, 1 t is hoped tha t it might provide the ·•merican

*1his att itude towa rds this Ar a b ship was
the Ar c:1 b Press , and linked by i t t o the visit of
.Prime .11' inister {Ben Gurian} to t he United St ates
1960, t h a t is, a few weeks before the boycott of
"Cleopatra " \'las proclaimed.

noticed by
Isr aeli's
in Harch,
the

J
reader with a factual survey and the vital data unobtainable
elsel&~here.

~

.. .l.,

Since for an understanding of this problem it is
.

•.

I

•

'

imperative to have some knowledge of the history and background of Palestine and of the Arab League - the chief agent
"'~

ft

.. •

•'

I

"'

'

for the boycott of Israel - these two subjects were chosen
.·
as an introduction to the main theme •
•t

'
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BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS

..
The problem of Palestine was created during and after
the First viorld l-Iar.

The ma in ca use was the conflict between
I

~I

political Zionism which wished to turn Palestine into a
Jewish state and the Arabs who formed the vast majority of
Palestine's inhabitants, anxious to ...
preserve the Arab
char a cter of their country and to continue living there.
Although Palestine has ha d

~

separate existence since

the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, geographically it is
pE.rt of Syria, a single region 1.-1hich stretches from the
southern edge of the Anatolian Plateau down to

~ inai

and

from the Meditranean to the 3yrian and Arabian deserts.
After 1918 this area was divided by the British and
French governments into four reg ions:
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

Palestine, '1 'rans-

In spite of this political and

..

administrative division it still retained its geographic,
national and historical Wlity, characterized by common

.

features of climate, vegetation and phyeica l structure
and
,
by the presence of a n indigenous Ar a b population that sha res
t

..

the same language and historical and cultural bahkg round.l
!I

Moreover, Palestine ha s always played an essential

lFou'ad No'shi, Palestine in the Ba ttle, Cairo, Egypt,
May, 1958, p. 10.

5
part in the religious life of the Huslims.; who regarded
Jerusa lem as their holiest
city at'ter l'lecca and Nedina.
,
One of the Islamic holiest, shrines, the Dome of the liock
in Jerusalem, was created by the Umayyad Caliph Abd~l
r·1alik Ibn Norwan more tha~. a thousand years ago, that is,
in 691 A.D.
Its Arab population descended froJU the indigenous

.

inhabitants, who had .been. in the country
. .since the earliest
recorded time, who were _ ~here whe~ , t~e .Jews entered it in
Biblical times, anq ~~~ ~ent on livin~ in it after ~he
Jewish dispersioi)-.1 Th~ cou~~ry bec?-me completely Arabised
and integrated in....the . Arab ~~ orld in the' 5th Century
B.C.
.
·rhe Jewish political
..... .. connection with Palestine had almost
come to an end 2,000 ,Y~ ars ago in the fi:rs.t century A.D.

.

At no time during .those
2,000 ye a rs did the Jews form more
. .
than a sma ll minority oft the populatio~ • ..

In 1917 -Palestine was and has been for 1,300 years,
an .B.rab country - of its population of about 650,000, more
than

6oo,ooo,

were Jews.

or about . 90% were r.rabs and only about 45,090

Of the

lt?,OOO

Jews who lived in .. i·alestine ii?-.

1917, many ~ere long e~~ablished ci~izens who had become
Arabised themselves. and lived at peace with Huslim and
Christian : rabs.2

' ,

. . e'-

2Ja mal Nasir, A. Day of Justice., Jerusalem, Jordan,
1956 , p . 7.

6

The last

Eu~ope9-n J~lif~

who came to·.. Palestine during

years, ~ had, no

the preceding 40

political ambitions, their •

.

presence in Palestine
. having,
. been motivated exclusively by
relig ious considerations.
'l'he political challenge to -.. the Palestine Arabs did

.

'

not, therefore, come from the local Jewish Community in
Palestine merely as a symbolic

spiritu~ l

home.

There were other Jews, however, who believed that
if their race was to fulfill its mission in the world it
must preserve and expand the Jewish heritage in Palestine;
and, finally, there was a group for which spiritual and
cultural considerations counted for less than did nat.ional
and political ones.

This group believed that .Palestine

should become the home of all the Jews persecuted in the
countries in
all Jews.

they

wh~ch

Gradually,

h~ppened

~twas

to live and, finally, of

the political national -element

within Zionism that succeeded to determine the policies of
the movememt.

't

It is, therefore,
briefly, the

sequ~nce

e~sential

of _events that Jled. to the

ment of the State of Israel.
story is

to , sketch out, however

represent~d : bY

'l'he ! decisive phase in that

what has come to be \known as the
,,

Husse in-l1acf1ahon...Correspondence.
I

'

'

During World War I (1914-191$},
Central Powers.

est~blish

~urkey

sided with the

England knew that Turkey was the weakest
1

; .. :.J ....

~·-

7
of four and her· COllapse I d8uld ~ weaken;· Or ·even lead tO ·the
uefent of Germany, BulgariB and Austria. · Knowing the Arabs
had numerous grievances ·against ' the Turks ·and· exploiting
stirrings of nationalism nmong• the educated young, Great
•·J

0

~

o

I,

..

#

f

,,

Britain encouraged the Arab ·to revolt against the - Turks.

?a:OM I ~"iES

Sir Henry· MacMahon, Kitchener's successor in Egypt
vli th the title of High Commissioner, began corresponding ..

\•.;i th King Hussein of Hecca and the guardian of the Holy
.Pl aces of Islam, in the hope of enlisting hi's support for
the a llied cause .3

The Hussein-Naci1ahbn. correspondence

began on ~uly. 14, l9J~ and'• continued. until
. January; JO,' 1916 .
\

)

In this correspondence Great Britain declared· he r willing1

. t

ness to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arab
'

countries

~'

and

\

their inhabitants and her readiness to

J

approve an Arab Calipha te upon its proclaimation.
l

After

~

some negotiation King Hussein outlined the territory of the
proposed Ara}? State as stretching from the .i1ed Sea to the
~l edi terranean,

north to the Bay of Alexandrette, east to

the Persian frontier and fina lly south to the Persian Gulf.
l

~

'

t

'

'l'he British expressed certa in reservations in the interests
of their

a~ly,

·'

.France,

especially about the two Vilayets,
.·

Juom Landau, Islam and the Ar a bs, George . llen and
Um-1 in Ltd., Woking and London, 1958 , p. 240.

8

Aleppo a nd Beirut, but t therEr ·was no doubt in Arabs minds
. • ·•

lr

tha t Pa lestine fel·l within the territories agreed upon as
1

•

t

' '

,..

I

•• •

,

•":)

T~e l Sha~ if,

belong ing to -the \ Arabs. l
)

I

\

convinced tha t his

•

proposa ls had 'been accepted, · -gave the signa l for revolt, and
\!

•

I

•

\

'

I

•

'

the 11r a bs threw their lot with the British against the
'l 'urks.

On the other side, Britain, France and Gza rist
Hussia opened discussions on the dismemberment of the
Ottoma n Empire and a division of the spoils.

'r he

ag re e~ent

•-I

rea che d during these discussions is known as the SykesIt was concluded in London on May 16, 1916.4

Picot Agreement.

Professor Hom Landau in his book Islam

~

the Hrab said :

In this agreement many of the promises
g iven to Hussein were disrega rded by the big
powers, while prepa red to recognize an
independent Arab St a te or -confedera tion of
Arab State, the three powers were gua r anteeing
one another certain rights in areas that the
MacMahon correspondence had either ex-plicitly
or implicitly promised to the Arab.5
.;

A few months later, on November 2 ; 1917, the British
government issued the statement destined to become
historic as the

~Balfour

Declaration:n

4aeorg~ Antonius,· ~ Ar ab Awakening, Hamish
Hamilton, Lqndon, 1938, p. 244.
.....

5aom Dandau, QQ. cit., p. 24).
t'

•c:... • \

•• ~.1

•

9
His 1-l~jesty ',s Q.overnment view \ii th. favour
the establishment in Palestine of a national
home for the Jewish people, and will use their
best ende&vours to facilitate the achievement
of this object., it being clearly understood
that nothing shall be done tlhich may pre judice
the civil and religiqus rights of exist~ng nonJewish communities in Palestine, or the rights
and political ijtatus · enjoyed by Jews in any
other country.6

In this statement the .i3ritish government had promised
the Jews a "national home" in i"'alestine, a · Palestine tha t
..
was to have formed a part of the new /,rab Kingdom.
•

I

It was not until December 1917 the Arabs received

.

.

through the f urks, the text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement,
'·
and King rlussein expressed his alarm by asking his ally,

Great Britain, for an explanation.

In its reply of

February 8, 1918, His Ma jesty's ~ove~nment tried to set

.

his mind at rest by informing him
• • • that the Turkish policy is to create
dissension by luring .t he arabs i!1to believing
that the Allied Powers have designs on the
Arab countries. His . ffiajesty's Government
reaffirm their former pledge in regard to
the liberation of t~e Arab people~ • • • 7

THE MANDA'l$ AND THE

COMHISSION

:- .

In November 1918, at the..end of,
4-,
______
..;,__ """

.. :., , ,,

• t-

.n ..

' L

I

\~orld
•

.

\•Jar I, the

• !-.

6J. C. Hurewi tz, Diplomacy in the ,Hear and fUddle
East, Vol. II, p. 26.
7Quoted by ftom Landau, QQ. cit., p. 243.

10

British were in militar~ :contro~ ' of Palestine, the l a rger
part of Syria and the whole

o~

Iraq, . the French had oc-

cupied Beirut, ·the Lebanon and Syrian· coust, including
Cilicia.

Shortly before the. end of hostilities, on

Hovernber 7, 1918, Britain and France reiterated their good
intentions toward_ the .Ar.abs..

They. declared that they

were working for the final liberation o£ the peoples who
had for so long been . oppressed by the

Turks and would set

up national governments and administrations which would
derive their authority from the . f.ree exercise of the
initiative and choice of the. indigenouB population.

l '

However the British and French military occupations in
the area remained in force, ostensibly to continue until
a final settlement could be reached at a general peace
conference.
Prince Faisal the

son~

of King Hussein, who had

be en large ly responsible for directing the .Arab revolt,
arrived in Europe to t ake part in the Peace Confere nce
at Versailles.

He

WR. S

snubbed by the French l'lho had no

desire to recognize him, and wa s received only coolly
r.,

i

•

~

.

by the Brrtish, and on January 1, 1919, he sent a

memorandum, to the Supreme Council at Paris Peace Conference

.

in which ne made a strong plea for the preservation of the

11.

essential unity or· the Arab' world.8

.

)

..

'rhe Zionist organization also sent a memorandum to the
Supreme Council·· at · the Paris Peace Conference; which, in
fact, was a draft resolution for the future Mandate of
Palestine. · It 'was based on the Dalfour Declaration but
a dded that the Mandatory should administer the country in
such a manner as to render the creation of an autonomous
commomfealth posslble.9 J
When Prince Faisal realized that · his plea.was not
heeded, he urged the Peace Conference to send at lea st a
commission of inquiry to Syria and Palestine in order to
as certain the wishes of the populace.

Thus started the

long line of commissions which re peatedly studied the
problem and usually came up with similar findings, but with
d ifferent recommendations.

~

· "·

'fhe first commission \'fe.s the King-Crane , Commission, 10
whose report wa s published on August 28, 1919.

8Hurewitz, QQ. cit., Vol. II, pp. J8-J9.
9Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 45-SO.
lOceorge Antonius, ££• cit., Recommendation of the
King-Crane Commission with negard to Syria-Palestine and
Iraq. Appendix H. p. 44).
-~

.·

12

However, mention should first be made here of the
General Syrian Congress which assembled in July 1919, in

• ' 'f ' , . ~

I'

Da ma scus and demanded a full and absolute \ political
independence for Syria , understood to be the territory from
I

the Taurus Rbnge to , a· line somewhat. s outh of Gaza to the
.
·•
Gulf of Agaba, and Syria to be a constitutional monarchy

.

~

.

·'

b a sed on democratic princ i ples a nd tha t Amir Faisa l s ha ll
be the ir king, and they will reject the . idea of a mandate

a s they believe that the Arab

of

i~abitants

~yria

a r e not

••
less fitted or gifted to govern themselves e.s certa in
A

othere nations (Bulgarians, Serbs, Rumanians) when g r ant ed
independence.

...

Theresolutions stated:

....

'•

.

(

If, however, the Pe ace Conference should
insist on establishing a Ioiandate, we ask the
United States of America to be the manda t ory powe r ,
for a period not exceeding 20 years , and if the
United States should find herself unable to
accede to our request. for assistance, then Grea t
Britain should be given the Mandate. We do not
recognize that the Brench government has any right
to any pa rt of Syria. We reject claims of t he
Zionist for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in the pa rt of southern Syria which is
known as Palestine.ll
The King-Crane Commission submitted .a very detailed
report which contained many fruitful suggestions, recommendations and we rnings of i mpending da nger.

Here a re

llG. :mtonius : QE. cit., nesolution of the Genera l
Syrian Congress, ,.,ppendix G. p. 440.
--

./

lJ
:;or.:e of the points:

,,r .

.

.

i-Je recom.t:lelld tha t the un1 ty of ::.;yria be

:preserved, ln ,accorda.nce ·with the ea~uest
petition of the J reat majority of the people

of ,.,)yrla.

,It is ·COncci vable 'thl'lt.. elrcumstances
mi'ght drive the' peace conference to SO!ne
such form of di vi<ted munclate, but it is not
a solution to be voluntarily chosen, from
tha. point of vie\i of the larger iucerests of
the people.
1'hf3 commissioners urge, therefo.t'e, for
the largest future ~ood or all groups and
regions like, the placing of the whole of
~ yria ·~uer n ,s1ngle mandate.

A national hallie for the . Jewish people
is not cquiv~lent to making Palestine into
a Jewish state; nor cun the erection of such
a Jewish state be accomplished without the
gravest trespass upon ·the civil and
religious rights or exist.i:ug non-Jewl.sh
communities.

If the principle of aelf-determination
)
to rule and ' the wishes or Puleatine arc
to be decisive u.s to what is to oo· ttone
with Palestine, the n it is to be re~embered
thut the no1~-Jew111h population of Palestine-nearly nine-tenths of the whole--are
emphatically against the entire Zionist
pro,sram. The Pe ace Conference s hould not .
shut its eyes to the faet ~ that the antiZionist feeling in .Palestine and !Syria is
intense and not lightly ~o . be • flouted.l2
1~

Uesp~ te

this, England. .Jlnd J-'rance continued with

their plans and igno~d .the unity of the Arab liorld.
12 Ibid

-··

Appendix 11.:.
.c ..

..

.-.)

.

•

I

.. ..

..

-! .. ~ \

-

··!_

..

'.fh'e

.
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.

'

decisions taken by the Supreme Council of the Allied powers
on April 2~ 192~ at San · atm~ spelled disaster for the Arabs.l3

.

'

Syria was to be broken up into three separate entities,
•

f

...,

Pa lestine, the Lebanon, 'a nd a "r~duced • Syria, consisting of
what was left.

Iraq was to remain undivided.

The mandates

were distributed to suit the interests of England and France.
Syria and Lebanon were given to France; Palestine, including
Transjordan, and Iraq went to Great Britain.

To the Arabs

this was the "Great Betrayai.wl4
The · Arabs belleved that the Palestine I1andate was
devised under the influence of the Zionists as an appropriate
means to give effect to the "Balfour Declaration.n

During

the thirty years that ensued, with the' British supervising
immigration,about 600,000 Jews entered the country, so that
by 1948 Jews c'omprised one-third of the population.
I

"

(I

Zionist immigration led to disturbances which
increased in violence, and in 1939 't he British Government
announced that the

11

national home• already existed; Jewish

immegration would cease after 'admitting 'another 75,000 persons;
and that Palestine would become independent within ten
years.l5

The Zionists condemned the statement as treachery
t

'

".,.

I

r

l3~ •• 'pp. 305-306.
14Sha1kh f·1 . Hussein Naseff-Al-Hussein Ibn Ali, Cairo,
Egypt, 1926, p. 28.. ..
--

1 5Nevill Barbour: Nisi Dominus, London, 1946, p. 147.

15
and began to attack government

~ersonnel

and installations

which culminated in July 1946 with the blowing up of King
David Hotel in Jerusalem.

One hundred persons connected

with the Palestine Administration were killed by the explosion.l6
"

•

\

'f

..

,·

LOUDON CONFERENCE

On September 9, 1946 - the conference convened;
neither the Jewish Agency for Palestine nor Palestinian
Ar a bs had accepted the invitation, but it was attended· by
r e presenta tives of the Arab States and the Secreta ry General
of the Hrab League.

.

·'IJ ..

.. "

..

No a g reement could be reached· and the conference
adjourned a t the beginning of October ru1d did not reassemble

. . : . ·..

until Janua ry 27, 1947.

\

On Februa ry 7, 1947, the British delegation submitted
ne w proposals which provided for a five-year period of
British trusteeship

independence ~

When these proposa ls also

were rejected, the British Government decided it had had
~ nough.

On February 18, 1947, the Foreign Secretary announced
tha t His Majesty's

Governa~nt

had decided, as no other

course was open for reconciling the conflicting points

16Jamal Nasir, QQ. Q!i., pp . 17-18. ·

·-

and

between Arabs

the tjJews ; to subm1:t ' the' whole problem to

...

the United Na tiona ,17 · ;. (...~ ·.·: ~

1:

t\ 1 t.l.

, •r. •

1· .• 1 ;

UNrrED NATION DECISiON .;.

'l

..

~. J

, .• ...

l.

~.

• •

-\

On November 29', ·1 947; the General Assembly adopted the
Palestine Partition Plan which provided for the. establishment
of a

0

Jewish State". and "Arab s 't ate" •' andan International

Zone of Jerusalem,

The plan gave the "Jewish State" 56% of

the total area of Palestine, including the fertile coastal
plains and rich belt, leaving 44% for the
Jerusalem International Zone,

-~~

'

0

Arab State• · and

'c'••

rhe Partition Resolution stipulated tha't the Jewish

1

and the Arab State were to· come into being two months after
the date of termination of the t1andate', which the British
Government had declared would take

plac~ · on

May 15, 1948.

In addition, the resolution provided for the establishment
of a Palestine Commission wf tn the responsibility of t aking
over administration as the Mandatory Power withdrew and in
due time hand over this responsibility to respective governments.l8

.,

!

,

'I

t• ..,
\

.•

'

t

l?Palestine, A, Study ' of ·Jewish~,. Arab, and British·
Policies, published for J the ESCO Foundation for Palestine,
Inc. Vol. II, pp. 37-38.

lBu. N. Resolution No. 181 (ll) of 29th November,

. 17
'f he Arabs

rejectff~ ' the

Partition because they

ma inta ined that the~ United Nations had no jurisdiction to
partition countries and requested that the matter be referred to the International Court· of Justice for an expression of opinion as' to the legal aspects of the case.

Their

rejection of the proposal - was also due to the fact that the
population of the nJewish Staten was to be 50 per cent
Arab and 50 per cent Jewish, with the Jews owning less than
ten per cent of . the total land area.l9

1'

'rhe United Natrona t pied to protect the Ar a bs of the
proposed "Jewish State• by providing that _their civil,
politica l, economic, religious, and property rights were in
no way to be prejudiced by the partition.

But shortly after

the partition resolution was adopted on November 29, 1947,
the Zionists bega n a campaign of ~ terror 'aimed at expelling
the Mos~em and Christian inhabitants, confiscating Arab
property without consideration, and occupying as much of
Pal e stine as they could before the British left . 20
'£he United Nations became ala rmed at the violence
tha t was taking place in Palestine; and in r~arch, 1948, 'met
19Sami Hadawi, Palesti ne Partitioned -~ ~-

( Excerpt~ Documents), New York, 1959.

20Ibid., p. 17. . · ·· ·
'

.. ..

,.
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to reconsider the partition, and there was talk of voiding
l i\!..

#

''(

~

it a nd making all of Palestine a United Nations trl;lsteeship.2l
&.

~} rl.)

\

.#

';.

~

... (.

As the date of British withdrawal approached, and
"'

•

•

I

•

•

•

o

.~

:..:•

•

fearing that the United Nations
would
alter its partition,
4o '
'\..
,.

J

J

r#

I

the Zionist underground forces--which later formed the
l
o•
~ oo
o
Israeli Army--intensified their attacks against Arab towns
I

•

I

··~

;, ,~ .

'n~

~

On April 9, 1948°, they at tacked the Arab

and villages.

•

0;

...

•

-

10

village of Deir Yasin and
massacred. 250 men, women and
! •
0

0

children.

This had the effect of creating panic among the
. '. (..
Arab inhabitants who began to flee w~th n<? fixed destination
in view.22
'fhe result:

Before the

~ritish

had left and before

a single soldier from
any Arab State was
on
Palestine
soil,
'0 ' .
\.
~
.
.
.
the Zionists had occupied territory reserved for the DArab

.

State" and the "International Zone of Jerusalem" as well as
the area assigned to the •Jew~sh State• while over JOO,OOO
Palestine Arabs were refugees in adjacent Arab countries.
'fhe Palestine Arabs
\,

.

appeale~

to the Arab $tates, and

on Nay 15, 1948 the Arab League cabled the ....;ecretary Qeneral
of the United Nations and informed him that the Arab States
•

•

;

...

'\

I

•

0

21
clyde Eagleton, llnnual Heview of United Hations
Affairs , New York University Press , 1949, p. 15J.
,

.- .

22M iller Burrows • Pale s t ine is Our Business , 'rhe
loJestminster Press, Philadelphia, 193'0, P. 68.
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"were compelled to iritervene ·in Pa lestine because the
dis t urbnnces there cona~ituted a serious and direct threat
•

l

t

•

to pe ~ ce and security in· their · territories and in order to
restore peace and · establish law in · Palestine.•2J .
Count Bernadotte ~ of 1 Swedent was ~ appointed United
Hations Mediator and entrusted with' the task of first
t erminating hostilities \a rid ·'tHen arranging for a peace
settlement.

On September 17, 1948, he was assassinated by

the Israelis in Jerusalem;24 · .~
In December 1948, the ~nited Nations met and
resolved that the refugees wishing to return to their homes
should be permitted to do so and that ·compensation should
be paid for the property of those not choosing to return.
At the same time, the Unit"&d .Nations appointed a '·Palestine
conciliation commission and entrusted it with the ' task of
settling the dispute.

•

A

t

..

""

meeting was called 'by the

I

..

com~s-

sion in Lausanne; Switzerland; ~ and on May 12 ;· 1949, a
"protocol" wa s signed whereby=Israel and the Arab States
undertook to settle the Palestine problem within the framework cf the

1947 Partition Plan.

But no sooner was Israel

accepted into the membership of the United Hations, when her

..

. . . . ,. . ,

"

2Js.

..

·..

....

! ~

Hadawl, QQ. cit., p. 14.

24I1illar Burrows, l.2R· . ill· , p. 69. .
',;

..

20

le aders repudiated ·their signature . 25 ·
The United Nations has not cea sed to remind Israel of
he r obligations under •the United !~at ion s resolutions, and
I s r ae l has just as consistently refused to comply.-

Ben-

Gurion has repeatedly decla red that not one inch of
territory occupied beyond the area assigned to the nJewish
St a te" under the Partition Hesolution would. be surrendered,
no t one single refugee will be allowed t o ·return, and
Jerusa lem shall remain for ·a ll times the capita l of Israe1?6
The Arabs of Palestine, on the other hand, ma i nt a in
that their right to Palestine is 'indisputable and res t s on
three distinct foundations:

the first is the natural right

of a people to remain in possession of the ' l and. of its
birthright, the second is ' tha t the' Palestine Ara bs have been
in uninte rrupted occupation for over lJOO yea r s , and the
t hird is that they a re still the rightful owners of the
homes and lands in which the Israelis now live a nd work.27
Henry Labouisse, former director of the

u.

H. Helief

and Hork Agency for Palestine Refugee s, reported to the
,.

;

~-

• •

'.

J

.'

(

26
David Ben..;Gurion, He birth 'and Destiny of Israe l,
th ilisophical L~~rary, N~w York, 19~ p. 489.
7Uejla- Izzedin, The J\rab ~/orld., Past, Pr esent. and
Funure, Henry llegnery Company, ~hicago, 195), p. 221.
2

•

•

a

..

21

Genera l . ssembly as far back as 1954 that the refugees must
be g iven the choice between repatriation and compensation as
prescribed in Assembly Resolution of 11 December, 1948.
Arnb

~ tatee

The

accepted the proposal, but the Israeli

re presentative rejected it outright and attacked it as an
encroachment on the sovereignty and the integrity of his
country.28

15, 1959, report to the General Assembly

In his June

recommending continuation of UNRHA until 1970, the
Secretary General said:

"No reintegration •muld be

sutisfactory, or even possible, were it to be brought
about by forcing people into their new positions against
their will.
l~sting

It must be freely accepted, if it is to yield

results in the form of economic and politica l

stability.n29
Whether justified or not, it became inevitable tha t
the establishment of the State of Israel in the heartland
of Arabism would monopolize most of the politica l
anxieties and energies of the Arab States.

Their overall,

centra l instrument for poli tice.l action

the Ara b

Le ague.

\'IBS

Though the League had come into existence a lready

before 1947, it was soon to find itself dealing more wi th
the problem of Israel than it did with- any other single problem.
28rb
---1.!!· • p. ,~2J.
I

29s . Hadawi, \.QR. ill·, p . 5.
!
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r

THE ARAB LEAGUE

'.

On December ,25, 1944,.

~fter

nearly two yea rs of

consultations, an Arab .c onference, presided over by Nus t afa
Al Na ha ss Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt, and attended by
delegates from Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria
and the Yemen, met in Alexandria and formulated what has
come to be known as the

n

Alexandria Protocol, 11 which

delineated the outlines of an Arab League.

Six months

later, on the 22nd of I"larch, 194.5, the pact of the Arab ·
League, based on the Alexandria Protocol was -signed at

,..

Ca iro, Egypt.30

'rhe Pact, which became •the ·constitution of the .Arab
League, contained twenty articles and three annexes.

'1'he

main purpose of the League, as embodied in the pact, i s
a s follows:

.. .

.' ' .

To co-ordinate the domestic and foreign
policies of member states, to s ettle t he ir
.... . ;.
internal disputes without ,• recourse to
•

••

I'

..

JOJameel .Shukai ry and · B. Ghazal, National and
I n t ernat iona l Ai ms, of the Ar a b League, Damascus , Syria ,
19.5.5. p. 27.
;

.. } :.

24
force,• an~ to cubm1t ' inter~Arab disputes to
the League ~ ounc11, whose decision would be
•executory and obligatory.'

To protect · and safeguard 'the integrity and
the independence of the me mber sta tes.
.

r.'

. •

.

.

To ins ure that, within the frame ~1ork or
the regime and the conditions prevniling in
eao,h. sta te, clos e cooperation bet rieen me mber
states should exiot 1n' econom1c and finnnci a l
affa irs, and ih ma tte rs connected witll
nationality, passports, visas and extradition,
socia l matters.\ advancen~e~t of e du ca tion ~om<l
public health.~l
· ·
Membership in the League, accord ing to Art1&le I, is
open to any independent Arab state.

This condition pro-

eludes from membership all non-i\r ab countries, although tf:1ey
may happen to be of

tr~

s ame geogr a phica l area , the s ame

culture and the s ame relig ion. · The ten Arnb sta tes which

are independent end 11ow make up the ·Lea gue are the United

J\r ab Repubiic, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Libya,
Lebnnon, Sudan, :funis and' Morocco . · : ·

~·

The />.r eb Lengue as a •reg ional orgnniza tion" fits

very well within the provisions

of ~Art1cle

Charter of the United Nations.

f>' irst, its objectives go

52 of the

beyond the domain of merely mainta ining peace and security,
beca use it aims at closer Wt1ty · among the members.

1945, when' the

In ·

seven stntes signed :the covenant of the

Le r.gue, they •hound themselves , under

~"\ rticle

19 of the

pEtct, to pool their individua l e ffort s t owards the achie ve -

J 1 Ib1d •• pp. )6-)7.

25
ment of goals common

~o

them in their

~eglon,

and to the

United Hations . .... ·-·
As a regional organization ,within the framework of
the United Nations., the Arab Lefigue can contribute to the
pacific settlemel}.t o:(.. disputes , @d~r Article 6 of its pact,
which is in line with Az:-tic.le , 51 of th.e

~barter.

Further-

more, to emphasize its chara9ter, as a regional organization,
the council of the Arab League,

Article J . of the pact

~der

decreed that
it shall
. decide upon .the
means of cooperation
•
t
..
with

~xisting

created in

international bodies

th~ fu~ure.

•

'

I

any that may be

~d
I

t

,

••

The first political problem faced. by the League was
the crisis that came to its cl:_imax in 1945 between Syria
and Lebanan, on the one

h~d,

and

!i'rance, on theother.

In reaction to this crisis all the League member states
were brought to !:1

~ified s~and,

considering t t1e crisis

as a c9mmon issue, and working toward a solution within
the

frame~ork,

guidance and direction of their regional

organization.J2

:

' .

The same situation also-. prevailed in 1948, with
respect to Palestine; but
this case

~hiefly

th~

League was unsuccessful in

because 9f political pressures and

conspiracies, and differences among the then governing Arab
J 2IbJ.'·d · p. 170 •
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regimes themselves.· -.Tile .. military failure of the' Arab armies
in Palestine was only a

~onsequence , of

those pressures,

conspiracies anddifferences, ,and of the deep-rooted corruption in the Arab governmenta,s as was to

be

revealed in

later years by the succeeding ones.
Although all the. members ·stood united in the Palestinean case they nevertheless failed; and their f.ailure
taught them that only by maintaining· and strengthening
their unified stand, would they eventually achieve victory
against the initial Zionist success. ·
The civil war which started in January, 1948 in the
state of Yemen at the death of its monarch,

!man Yahya,

offers a good instance of the role· which can be played by
the League.

The Arab League acted immediately by sending

an investigating committee and by recognizing the new
ruler.

By so doing, the League ·brought to that area

peace and order.
In 1950; the General Assembly of the United Nations,
on the basis ·of the precedent already established in the
case of

the ~G>rganization

of American States in 1948, invited

the first Secretary-General of ' the Arab League to attend
its meeting as an observer.JJ
t

•

I

. \.
.,

'

JJibid
_ . ,'1. p.• 60 •• <·•.• ,

·'

'

2'1

The oor.1bers of the League took steps to further their

coo pert!tion by signing the colle ctive security pact of
the l1id.dle

East~

in· conformity with the principles und. objec-

tives of the pact of·· the Arab Lefl6Ue and the charter of the
United Nations.
L'he Arab Lea&"'Ue did

nctivity only.

not limit itself to pol1t ?.cul

In fact, s ome of its most . const.ructive work

wns done in the legal, socinl, cultural, and economic
fields.

'l'hus , the League prepared the code for inter-Arab

private international law; and, in Octobez·, 1949, it
concluded an agreement on the nationality of citizens of
Arnb states rsu1d1ng abroad.

In 1952, three more legal agreements were approved.
by

the League: one related to the

11

:Jervine; of Swnrnons and.

.Power of Attorney," another• relating to the "Exe cution of
Judgement," nud one on

for close
criminals.

collnbor~tion
~-;evet..a l

11

Extro<lit1on Agreement , " . Providing

with rega rd to the surrender of

other agreements were drafted nn<.l

a pproved by the Arab League.
However, it is to be noted that the procedure adopted
for concluding agreements is very slow, because a draft

agr0ement adopted by the council and signed by the delega tes
must also be ratified by the parliaments of euch country
before go ins into effect.

28
In the social field, the Arab League organized, in
collaboration with the United <Natfons, four seminars, lihich
were attended by experts and delegates from the Arab states
and foreign countries •. · The first seminar held in Beirut
from August 15 to .September 1, 1949, made a general and
preliminary study of. social welfare in the Arab states;
the second seminar held in Cairo from November 22 to
December 14, 1950,dealt with rural sociology; the third
one held at Damascus, from December 8 to December 20, 1952,
dealt with social assistance; and the fourth one held at
Bctghdad, from March 6r to March 21, 1954, dealt with social
welfare in agricultural development and industrialization
of the Arab S tates~J4
'I'he Arab Lea0ue established model \'lelfare centers in
lraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen, and held a social workshop
in Ga iro for two months (September and October, 1956).
r wenty-six Arab .Health Conferences have been held by the
League, and a permanent Health Bureau was established in
the

Secretaria~

besides the Anti-Narcotics Bureau, which

investigates the cultivation, smuggling and trading of
narcotics.

The League concluded, on

r1ay

28, 1959, an

agreement with the International Labor Organizati'on ( ILO)
to promote social and- labor stand.ards •·in' the Ar a b states .35

.
J4 ~
I
•• p. 81.

~

..

.. 1

'

•t

35 Arab League· Bullet·in, Cairo, Juner;. 1959.

\

•
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One of the League.' s major co:1cerns . was in. the cultural
field.

On November 27,r 1945, a

cultural - ~greement wa~

signed which · def:ined the · goalp and principles of interArab cultural cooperation. ,

..

,~

'rhe two chief aims of . the

Le?~'Ue

in this field were

the standardization· of, various, educa:-t ional systems a nd the
enrichment of 1rab culture.

Agreements designed to insure

the realization of this first objeqtive included inter-Arab
exchange of tea chers, profe s sors,. ,and scholars; standardization of scientific terms; information concerning the
social, cultural, economic, and polit-ical conditions . in all
Arab countries- by means of broadcasts, the cinema, and the
press,
The means to enrich Arab culture were:

the trans-

l ation of foreign works, the encouragement of intellectual
pursuits in the Arab countries by granting prizes, opening
institutes for scientific and

lite~ary

research,

promulgating legislation for the protection of authors•
rights in member states of the Le.ague; qrganizing visits
by

Arab scholars, and encourag ing cultural, scie11tific and

e ducational conferences.
The Arab League

e~tablishe~

an .Institute .for the

Hicrofilming of Arabic f1anuscripes throughout the world
and an
i~rab

lnst~~ute

of Higher Arabic Studies; it held several

cultural, scientific, archaeological and linguistic

confere nces, and sports tournaments; established a museum

JO
for Arab culture,

and ~ continues

to cooperate with inter- .

national cultur·al organizat:Lons, such as UN1::$CO and others .J6
In the economic field, . the Arab League made a great

Many projects have · been studied but not all of

effort.

them have reached the stage of practical application.
In accordance with 11rticles 7 and 8 of the Joint
Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty (1950), the League
established an Economic Council

11

· to ~ brin~

and prosperity in the Arab countries."

about security

In general, the

council was to organize and coordinate economic activities

anu to formulate . agreements necessary for raising the
standard of living among member states.

Accordingly, the

bconomic Council concluded in 1953 the following two
conventions:
1.

Convention for facilitating trade exchange
and regulating transit trade between • .
states Jof the Arab League.

2.

1 :

Convention for the settlement of payment
of

cnrr~nt .

transactions and the transfer

of capit~l between st~tes · of the ~rab League.J7

. ' ..
J6Jameel Shukairy , and B. Ghazal, QQ. cit., p. 276.

J7ill!! •• p. 275.

Jl
One of the most vital achievements of the Economic
Council was the establishment of the Arab Financial Institution on June J, 1957.

~he

Institution officially came into

being on January 12, 1959, when tota l subscriptions exceeded

75 per cent of the $57,400,000 called for in the original
charter of the institution.
The aim of the Institution (popularly known a s the
Arab Development Bank) is to encourage economic development
through private and public projects in Arab states·.
participation in these projects can either be

Its

throu~h

the

extension of loans or by preparing blue-prints for such
projects.

It is also empowered to solicit forei gn invest-

ment for such projects.J8
In addition to the Arab Development Bank, the Economic
Council founded a

l~ederation

ngricultural chambers, an

of Commercial, lndustrial and

_:~ rab

Tourist As"s ociation, an

Arab Maritime Company, a Postal Union, and a stamp museum
at the League Secretariat in Cairo.

The 6ouncil has also

approved establishment ·or an Arab Broadcasting Union, an
Arab ;.viation Company, established an Arab .Potash Company
to promote production of potash in Jordan, an organized
general .\rab Petroleum Congress and exhibition, which is
to be convened shortly in Cairo.

J8Arab League Bulletin, Cairo, Egypt, February, 1959.

J2
Last and not leaat, the Arab

~ague

ha s been waging

a partially sw.:ceusful boycott agninst Israel.

In o rder to do so, the

is the topic of the present S.tud.y.
League

h C!S

va.rious

founded a special Boycott Off ice \·oli Ul its hee d-

in Damascus,

qu~rters

'r his boycott

r;·rc i:~ber

5 yri~,

end local

office~

in the

statas.

The 1-'lOt'k o1' the .\rab Lcnt;ue , has ouffereu some f a ilure

and dionppoiutroc nts in the poli-cica l renlm, but on tho other
ha nd , it should be crcctited for the nchievernoncs accomplished
throut;h i.ts nonpolitical activities .

'l'he

:\ rt.~b

League • us it stends no\-#, works to promote

a nd. fulfill the principles set forth in its Fact.

It. has

tried to help its members to achievo full indevendel'lce and

to check interference by tho i.•reat Powers in an area of
strategic importance und oil wenlth.
?he /-.rab League ha s given ' its members a mot•e prominent

place in world affairs, but many internal problems hllve
cuased occasional embarrassment.

Its future will depend

fina lly on the strength of the principles wh1chhol't it
together.
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THE ARAB ' BOYCOTT
The Arab .States

urge~

o.

! •

II

..

.

- -·

•

'lfheir , boy~ott of Israel

~~

a . 'lli• r:

defensive measure against the establishment , of that state.
'

It represents a protest . ~g~inst
pers~stently :t..efused

•

~!!~

Resolution of 1947 , , under wh1ch 1 it

~arne

cent. m~re

continues to occupy 40 per
'

Israel prevents the
refugees who

I

into being, _, and

territory

t~an w~s
~

-

had ~ been expell~g. , fr;om
de.cid~d

the

~illion A~~b~J

their hqmes.

~

.

.,.
•

retur~ . of

tionalization qf Jerusalem,.

•

UniJ;ed Nations_

granted it by the United· Nations.
•

4

t~at, Isra~l.,. has

fact

l~ye , up , ~~ th~

to

•

,

."

~~

. Interna ~ .,

upoJ! by the United

Nations, continues to subject the Arabs who remained in
Israel to discrimination and 'Pet:~~cu~iq_~. ,... ·.Hor~ov~r,. a •
Israel harbors

es~sionist
.. .,
..

~ -~: •.

designs,
.
.. ·and has made military
•"" .. - . l

In the past, relations between Arabs and Jews in

Palestine were not friendly.
welcomed the

~m~_igra;tes

A~te;r . 18,6Q,

the Arabs

who ..~~~~.veci , ~~'fr~f,u~y~s

:'~"··,

r~~~~~-

Russian persecution or who ca me from religious reasons.
Despite the fact t~~~ the , Jew~ ~~r~ . estab~~shcd in their

.!. r.·

r

35
own : . ettlements, the· Arabs did nothing to prevent them from
a c~ ·..nring

.

('

new l and for further settlements, and they helped

them in many other ways.39
The Arab at~ti tude t'oward the Jews did not alter even
when the newly established Zionist organs sent to Palestine
the so-called "Second Alliya h"--a far grea ter wave of
•

I

i mmigrants reached Palestine.

But while· the fi r a bs continued

to welcome their Jewi sh g uests, the Zionist l eaders in the
new settlements soon initiated the practice of "boycot ting "
their Ar a b hosts.

The f irst step was to expel the Ar abs

who had been ruid were being hired by each settlement to
watch over its property and guard its a ssets.

In a paper

wri t ten in 1917 under the heading,

~on

and recently published in his

Rebirth andDestiny of

bo~

Judea and Galilee,"

Is r ae 1, 1'1 r. Be n-Gurion describes how he and his a ssociates
agitated \'lithin their settlements to expel the Arab
wat chmen.
" \<le

wished to vindi ca te our na tiona l honor, the honor

of our work of revival," he writes.40
Ha ving preva iled on their fellow - settlers to expel
..

-

.:

..

39General Union of t he Arab Cha mbers of Commerce,
I ndustry, and Agriculture, The Ar a b Boycott of Israel: Its
Gr o unds and Its Regulations, Beirut, Lebanon, 1959 40David Ben-Gurion, QQ.

£11.,

p. 15.

)6
Arub "Hatch and \-J ard," as the first 1-'r-ime i1inister of Israel
..

,'t:;~

later confessed, the leaders .of the first decade Zionist
lt

.... '

settlement in Palestine soon -moved on to consolidate their
gc;.ins.

Their next objective

\'lOS

to ·bar J.rab workers and

farmers from working on · Jewish settlements.

This policy

was later adopted officially by Zi'onist congresses, and laid
down as one of the basic principles of Zionism.

It was a

condition which the Jewish agency, in order to secure the
cooperation of Zionists came to accept as one of the
i nviolable principles.41 .
Dy virtue of this principle, innumera ble Ar abs who
were dispossessed of their, lands were also being denied the
means of livelihood on those l&nds.
that the swelling of the
eventually

ranl~s

prove ~ explosive.

It was to be expected

of such displaced Arabs would

Yet Zionist historians speak

of this practice ·as one of ··the most farsighte d mea sures
introduced by the early Zionists and one of the most significant features which differei!tiated the Zionist settlements of the 1900's from the · Pre-Zionis t settlements of the
1880's.

Thus I1r. Israel Cohen, one-time General Secretary

of the Central Office of the World .Zionist Organization,
writes:
A radical change wa s brought about by the
.6 ionist organization and the Jewish National
41 Israel Cohen, ! Short History Q£ Zionism, p. 125.
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Fund, for . the .. Jews \'#hom they settled on the
soil wera primarily a ctivated by the desire
that the land should: remain permtmently: in'
Jewish possess ion, and they considered it
esst:~ ntial to this end .. tha t it snould a lwa ys
ba cultivated by J ewish labour. 2
.

J

' ..:

..

!:.ipe akin5 of the e a rlier .Pre-Zionist settlemeut, he
s a y3 : " 'l:he most serious blemi s h, from t he J eHi s h po i n t of

v i e w,

\'l aS

that the hired l a bour consisted entirely of

Arabs."4) Aga in, oontra stilliS the two types of i mmi gr a tion
a nd settlement, he S6ys:

Prom the year 190.5 there wa s a new wave of
JeJ'Ii oh i mmi grat ion into .Pales t ine , the
Second Waye • • • the y were animated by
s ocialist idea s, they wishe d to s ee J ewish
iu.t!JC1S, and they were looked at · AsKance by
t he older genera tion of colonists, who
ectployed ;\rab labour. • • n44
'lbus, as the a bove quota tions indica te, t he pri ncip le
of boycott of one community by the othe r ~'la s first i n tro-

duced, not by t he Ar abs, but by the Zionists.
~ EXPAN:iiONI ST DES I GNS OF l SMEL

'.i'he ,\rab attitude toward Isra el is grea tly influenced
by the fe a r of further Isra eli expansion.

I sra el is on

record a s harboring designs for furthe r territorial
J ~

. ..:' ... .. .

42Ibitl., p. 116.
4Jibid.' p.

-·· pp.

44I bid

38.

'

c

6)-65.

J. '

J8
expansion.

ro Israelis of allwalks of life,
.

1

l'

Is~a el

is no t

I

an end in itself, nor ..is ··rt; •·the complete embodiment of the
Zionist vision.

'Agafn rA'nd "aE;ain · Zionist' and Israeli le aders

i's

have said that Israel

mere'ly a phase in self -realizat ion

of the Zionist Hovement--a statioil' along the roa d, not a
te rminus.

'r he ult'imJ te z:.ton ist vis ~on i s of a state in the

entire a r•ea known · in Zio'nist terminology as "Eretz Is rael."
l.' t1i S

a re a I covering ·t he whole or:·'mandatory Pa les tine and

f ormer 'l 'rans-Jordan ; is 'eight ti mes a~ ·l a rge as tha t
a ssigned to the "JeNish" 's tate by the lJni ted ~~ at ions in
...

its l'a.rtitiort' Re solutHm:• o'f 1947.

....

l'he re a re toda y in the Parlia ment of I s r ae l, )8
I

.

>.,l J

I

meiJl.-ers out of a total · mcrnoership o'f' ' 120 who are committed
to the principle ·tha t th~ r emainuer of :s o-ca lled II I~re tz
.
. ..,
I srael " sho.ll be' brough t under the control of the state.

.

~

J

::hen

'.'le

recal'l that parliamentary

electio ~Js

in Israel a re

conducted on the ba sis of "proportionpl r e presentation,"45

.

.

.

we re c.1lize that ·close to one-third of the. vot ing popula tion
of Israe l ha s thus

ex presse~

itself in the 1955 e l e ction as

being in favor of a n "a ctivistn program of expansion.
1.ccording to its officia l platform, the Herut Party "Calls
for the territorial integrity

o~

Eretz Israe l (Land of

Is r a el) in its historic boundaries · on~ both sides of the

45s t a te of Israel, Facts a11d Figures, 1955, p . 17 .

J ordrul. •

Ahdut Haavod.a-Paolei Zion struggles for the crehtion
of ''a socialist state of Israel in entire ho!lleland," and
the General Zionist Party proclaims that "'i'he

Israel does not

e~ist , for

~i ta.te

of

its own snke but ,as an inE?trumellt

for the implementation of the Zionist idea~.n46
Nor is this candid avowal of expansionist aimG confined
to so-ceil led "ex1;remists. n

Premier Ben-Gurion, wri tine; in

the Government Year Books, asserts

~hat ~he

state

"ha~

been

res urrected in the »estern part of the land of Isracl,"4?
tmd

that independence has been reached

small country."

r: in

a part of pur

He says:

i;;very state consis'tn of a land and a peo,plc.
Israel is no exception. but 1t is a state
identical neither with its land nor with
its people. !t has already bSen i>a.id that
\'lhen the state \1a.s established it held
onl1 six per cent of the Jewish people
remaining alive after the Hazi Cataclysm.
It must now be said tha t 1t hns baen established in only a portion of the lund
of Israel. Even those who are dubious :~o
to the restoration of the historical
frontie~s, a3 fixed and cry a tallized lmd
given fro.m the beginning pf time, will
ha rdly denl the anomaly of the boundaries of
the state.
J,··

...

46Ibid., pp. 17-19.
_
. 47state or lurae1, Goy;ernmen1!, Year lli29..!i, .571J
J.ntroduction, 1952, p. 13.

=----·.

48vbid

..,.,..
p • .s..;>.
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But, apart from what its political or its national
leaders proclaim_, the State of Israel, as a state, is
officially on record as committed to this expansionist
program.

In the most

author~tive

officia l state document

that Israel publishes, the Govern.I!lent Yearboolt (for

1955), the statement is made in behalf of the state itself that the creation of the new state by no means
derogates from the soope of historic ~Eretz Israel.~49
Arabs believe that the decision to expand, having
been made by Israel, · menns that its
a matter of time.

impl~mentation

is only

Zionism in the past sixty years has proved

itself to be not unprepar.ed to seek, its ultimate goals
piece-meal.

\lhile expressing apparent contentment, with a

lesser goal, according to the concrete possibilities of
the moment,

~ionism

has always been poised for a scension from

the temporary goal,_ at

tn~

convenient moment, towards

further objectives formerly disavowed in public.

There is

no reason to assume . that today's disavowal of expunsionist
intentions, \ihich are..occastonally. made by Israeli leaders ,
for

interna~ional

consumption, reflects more .truly the aims

and designs of Zionism than do.· the perennial pronouncements
of Zionis.t
Israel by

mas~ers,

the political declarations made in · · ·

r~sponsible

1l-9Ib ·d.

_l._.'

p._ 32.

political leaders, .and the practical

t.

41

indications

embodied · ~n

of which jointly

Israeli me a sures a nd policies--all

point ~ in

...

\

THE i}OALS OF 'J!HE BOYCOT'f

the di r ection of future expa nsions.

..

..;
.,

f he .. r a b states re a lized that· Israel, a smRll

1

unviable country, could not supply the neces s ary food
pronuction, raw materials for industry or natura l resources
for her surviva l l'li thout the. assistance of the surrounding
Arab countries.

It wa s clear to• the Ar ab states that

Israel, at the center of the Arab world, drea med of being
the industria l sea t for the Arabs, and t !1us domina te their
economics.

'f hrough economic streng th, Israel, with its

steady flow of immigr ants, would be

in

a position for

politica l domination.50
Could the 1l.r ab St a tes safeguard themselves a gainst
such domina tions by politica l mea ns? . The political
support Israel found in the most influe ntial
put her politically in a very

f~vornble

\~estern

States

position, a nd the

Arabs had to think · of other weapons than political ones.
Only through economic pressure might they possibly prevent
the territorial gro'ltth of Israel.

the

~rab

In the light of this,

states envisaged ·the economic · boycott of Israel

as the only defense against Israeli economy.

;.~ o.

y

i

\

..

50Bul·l etin of the Main Office of the Arab Boycott,
207, 59, (Janua ry 25, 1959).

....

h2

The l\rab states kne'l'! t ha t if the ..r ab foo<l supply to
I s r ael were cut off, Israel would huve to import foodstuffs
frcJm more distant countries; thi s would substantially r a ise
the cost of living.

If 1\rab raw ma terh1ls for industry

were Ni thheld , along -vri th nat.. ura l resources, I srae 1 would
be forced to import these materials from non- hrob neiJ hbors,
thus r ?. i s ing the cost of production a!ld the cost of e a ch
product.

\Hth the higher cost of living , rvages '1ould. F.;.lso

spirAl so tha t production costs would raise even higher,
ma king it impossible for Israel to compete with other
industrialized countries or even to find foreign markets
for her over-priced products.

Under the law of supply cmd

demand , Israeli production could not be s uff iciently g reat
to make it economicnl under the s e conditions.
lon~

In the

run, Israeli f nctories mieht be forced to close

entirely .

Thus , according to the Arab re nsoning , Israel

would f a ce the possibility of economic c istress.
'.i.'he

:~ rab

boycott has run through to sta ges .

The

firs t , with limited goP. l s and means started during the
da ys of the British I1andate , a nd was direc ted toward the
Jews of Palestine .

It bega n in 1945, but was met with

little success.

The second stage of the boycott

a ga ins t Israel.

It began officia lly in 1951 and still

continues.

WRS

directed

i\ctually, it was only a continuation of the

first boycott.

..
\;HAPTER

IV

'· '

THE BOYCOT'.r OF 'fHE JmJS IU .b~LJ:S 'i' I i'f.C
~

.'

..
J

•• j

•

''

• L

...

''

...

..H.,,

't

J'
0

.

'~

....

l

.

~

.

.._.,._ .

.. ..

\

.

·-

\

'

.

... ., .

._'\ j

I,

'

. ....'
... ' ..

'

,..

. . ·.

... . l

~

.• . ." \t
I

j'

'!. ..'.

'\

•·

)!

-

I

•

'

. ..

IV,

CHA.PTit;a
,. , .

,F t

·- '

1

'

) •

'l'he first- ata,ge of the boyoopt began in December,

,Bri.tish Mandate

1945, during the

stage, the objective,
alization

or

w~s

to

sor

Palestine.

preven~:

During that

the : Z.i o!list industri-

Palestine and, subsequently,. the establishment

of a Zionist state.

•

1."-

I

:

• I·

i~rab ~tatf:!S,

'I'he Council of :he , Le_a gue of

in its

meeting of December 1, 1945, found that •so long as the aims
of the

Zion1~t

industrial,

other eco11omic

oofll!nerci~l ~:lnd.

activities were mally political,

long as the s uccess

m1~ ~o

of these aims depended on the exploi t.ation of ;\rab markets.
the ,\rab a tates had to defend PaleGtiue and resort of
'

'

effective means to keep it Arab. .51
11

Co~cil adopt ~ d.·

·rhe Arab Lctig-ue

guiding principles: ,
\,.

1.

. "'" -'

""

'

..\..

\.

.. . : •.

the following

.., ~ ,J .

All commodities and manufactured products

·-,?f1

~·l:!~eatine ~ewish . o~igi~

~

t

-1"

t

are lpl.desirab+e
,.

:

•

· 1).'. t~~\ 1,\r~b cow1;tr~e's. 1 ' Importing~ such
.J

o

o

(.

I

#

.

...

..

o

go,o ds.... would. further
the realization of the
.
\

51Jameel Shukai~ Y and il. Gazal, 22· gil •• p. 141.

J•

t

45
~ntil

political objeotives .of Zionism.
these

politics~

~hanged,

oojectives .are

the Couhcil· of' the League of Arab States
decided that each state must
sary

measures~,

tak~

neces-

appropriate ·to that state,

in accordance with the laws and
administrative procedures of the country
concerned.

For example, it envisaged

the use of import licenses in order to
prevent the importation--either directly
or indirectly--of goods from Palestine.
In addition, the. use of any possible means
to resist the Zionist industrialization
of Palestine wa s considered desirable.
Whatever measures taken should be effective prior to January 1, 1946.52
2.

The Arab League Council invited the Arab
peoples not represented in the League to
cooperate with the states of the League in
the execution of this resolution and to
_.. t

..,

..

:

..,

52collection of the Resolutions of the Council of the
of Arab States from the first session (J anuary 4, 1945)
to the 27th session (l'larch 18, 1957) Resolution Uo. 16,
second session, 22nd meeting , (December 2, 1945), p. 8. Hereafter cited as Resolution.

L~ ague

46
prevent ipstitutions, organizations, merchants,
middlemen, and all individuals, from handling, distr,ibuting·,o.r consuming .Zionist
products

J.

~d

manufactured goods.·

I.

•

' .

'·

1

A committee

~pres~n~ing

Arab

was .to be established to execute·

Leag~e

the states

0

this resolution and to study any

or~

the

propos~ls

..

which tlould
lead to the . realization of the
"
Arab obje~tiv~ of curbing the Zionist
economic threat.5l

On January

5, 1946, the committee established by

Article J of the above , Hesulution, held its first ' meeting
in Cu iro.

At that .rneeting, representatives from member

states of the Arab League reported any legislation adopted
and measures ,taken in order to aarry out the proposed
economic boycott of Palestinian Jews • . '!he reports clearly
indicated that· each member state had approved and executed
the boycott resolution adopted by the Council.
Further, the, individual states offered encouragement to Palestinian Arabs -wishing to import raw materials
from

neighbo~~ng

Arab states and to export

agricultura~

manufactured products.

.. '

and
· ~·

The boycott committee, in cooperation' with the Arab
Hi gh Committee of Palestine and the local chamber of

53!.12!!! •• p. 8.

\

I

47
commerce, established .a permanent office in Palestine to
provide rnernbEfr st'ates wi tb information ·indicating .the origin

{Jewish or

non-~ewish)'

of manufactured products.

The

structure of small business in Palestine, with Jewish craftsmen working among Arabs and all producing nea rly identical
a rticles--made such an office .necessary in order to differentiate between prohibited Jewish products and other
Pa lestinian products.54

..

At 1ts 'th1rd session in narch, 1946, the .boycott committee reported to the Arab League the various me asures
t a ken by individual me t.'lber states to\'Iard the implementation
of the boycott resolution.

In eddition. the committee

suggested to the League that the boycott could be furthered
through an increase of foreign imports which would replace
goo ds formerly imported from. Palestinian Jews.

This \·J ould

discourage merchants from illegally importing Palestinian
Jewish goods for which there was a strong demand in

market.

rioting that the measures . t a ken by

~he

~di vidua l

Arab

states were in some cases lax, the committee suggested a
tightening of the

already· establ~shed· boycott

ma chinery.

In June, 1946, at the fourth session of the Council of
the League of Arab states, local boycott comntittees were
I <

established in Palestine and in every member state.

These

loca l committees .•wero connected with the permanent committee

54J ameel ShuKa iry, Q£, £11., pp. 142-14).

48

.·

of the League directly ~ ~··P· r.

r

I ' ·'

(

The Council 'also tdeoided· to give

.
t

..

• • '

so

,

.,

_,

.

pe~ cent of any

illegally imported merchandise .. confise'a ted to the individual
responsible

, ,..

·ror '·tHe lse'!zure-!o'f ,sucn ..goods.

At the sRme ):fession the Council decided that restrictions ag.~inst the use oft' Palestinian Jewish services--such

<:ts ba nking, transport, insurance, constl"uction, a nd
'l'he positive nspect of

professions--should be established·.

the boycott, i.e., the encouragement of Arab services, wns
empha sized • .5.5

r.: .. •

t•d:

In .rtareh, 194?, at its sixth sesriion, the Council of
the League entrusted. the Permanent Boycott Committee with
complete responsibility for the· implementation'
boycott resolutions.

of

a ll

This gave ·the Committee the right

to t a ke any measures necessary for the furtherance of the
boycott • .56

.1. '} \,.. ~, ':

The Permanent Boycott Committee', at 1ts seventh
session, in October, 194?, submitted

to

the Council of the

Arab League," a comprehensive report on the nctivities · of the
f, rab Boycott during the period ·between January,·· 1946, :md
..

'-·~.

5.5Ibid.·~ ' Re·solu"tfon No. 70, · 4th session, 6th mee·ting,
June 6, 1946, pp. 19-20.
.. •

•

,.

..

.... ..... ...,

<I

, ...

-"

•

.,.,

.,

56 .!.12!Q.. ~ Hesolution No. 152, Narch 24, !947; p. )5.
"

•

~

" ..

W'

'

l

.. ~ '\. <I '•

•

d

#I

I
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:.>e p tember, 1947.

recommenda tions

'l 'he report concluded with the follo\'1ing
aime~ · at

tating trade between the

1.

tightening the
~reb

~oycott

and. facili-

countries:

li'urther legislation, including prohibition
of export of raw. materials ·to

l ..alestinian

Jews,

should be adopted by the individua l me mber
states. . .: ·. c ·.,

2.

Inter-Arab .trade should_be encouraged through
1

the states, during the interim period

preceding tha;,adoption by the .A rab League
mem~rs · or

·new passport and nationality

regulations faclliteting

tr~vel.

J. Any trade restrictions held over

from war

time must be eased, in order to increase trade

between membcrs . of . the Arab League.
4.

The Permanent ·.Boycott Committee noted tha t

as a result of the boycott, the Jewish
manufacturers in Palestine were forced to
reduce costs, in order to underprice products,
and thus encourage Arab smuggling of

.Palestine Jewish products.

Consequently, ,the

committee recommended tha'b .'\rab manufa cturers
be

encouraged to reduce costs through

utilisation of modern methods of produotion,
in- order to compete ·favorably with the

-~iQnist

market and .. the.rebyt ~move, from the mer.chants,

50
the temptntJ on

5.

ca.pi tal

,.

1

Hj1~~~ _Z~pnis,t 1ndustl•y

In case_,s
closed

~t..o smu;:~gle.

a~~

a res,ult of the

a_ho~~d ~,be

~

• •

iu Paleotine

~ycott,

emP.lO,Yed

~to

. '!. .....

I

·Arab

'J

re-os'tnl?liah , ..

the induutr.y :.¥der A.t:#b ~ltfnOrsh1p ~nd manage-

ment.
6.

•

•

•

"'•

•:

.

. .

j. ~

?iot1ng -tha t .c a pltal was being tra.nsfc:rtred

from

indu~tries Laffected ~Y

the

boyc~tt

to

the trausporti!tion industry, thus re-

employing those Jews who'} had lQst jobs es a
res:..tl t of the boyoo t t , and _e na_bling the
Z ionists _ ~

.1 ..

fac1lita te _smuggl1nB through

the ir contr.ol of. : tranaportat ion, the Gommi ttee recommeitde~ . that ,the Ar ab 1eat!l-ue

resolution of December, 1945 be runended to
I

inc l ude the boycott of Zionist-operated
transportation
'? .

~n - Pales~ine.

Not ing that some .i\.ral> manufB-oturers . reta i ned
Je\'liGh ,a_gents in Pa~est1ne, the Committee
recomGiendod that the me:nber s t a tes of - the

abolish this practice.

League t al<e .a ction to

8.

Notil_lg ~ the astnpli~hment : of. the loca l , . ,

boycott
by

~omm ittee by

the resolution

the Council, at its

f~ur~h

a~opted

apeciul

s~ssion,

the P~rma~ent Boycott ~~C?~~~ ltttee . recommende4

the.t the ·Council sugge s t the following

111e~ho<ls

-51
to the member 'states in order to standardize
,,
the boycott 'm achinery; · ' 1 '
..
•
a.

Local committees should supervise the
implementa tion of all boycott resolutions
adopted by the Council of the i\rab League
I

r

•'\'

_,

•

and any locally adopted decisions or
measures · concerning the boycott.
b.

The local·· committees should remain in
constant contact ti1th'i the Permanent
Boycott' Committee,' ih Cairo·, in order
to insure cooperation· and· the effective
working of t he boycott ma chinery.

c.

1

1 he loca l · committee should ma intain
•

•

'

t

•

similar contact with the concerned branches
of local government, in order to judge the
practical '~'

locally
d.

results ·of'.the boycott as

.

implemented ~

The local committee should inform the
public of the boycott and its meaning
through constant contabt with loca l ·
groups and organizations.

e.
\

.

The loca l commit tee should \mrk 'through
the concerned branch~s of gover1~ent
in order to f acilitate the export of
agricultural products, ra.\'T materials and
;

,._,

f t,;

manufactured goods to Palestinian nrabs.

.52
f.

The

local . ~?mmittee

should examine all

import;.ex~ort . lic~nses

for . Palestine on

the basis
furnished by
.
'of information
.
the permanent boycott office in
Palestine and tht; . insturctions given
by the poncerned branches of local

•:

government in order to overcome any
illegal
trade.
.
.
g.

•l,

The local committee should be informed
by

concern~d

branches of local government

(polfce, customs, etc.) of any breaches
of the boycott.
h.

All data and statistics should be
analyzed by the local committees in
order to determine the effect of the

'.
boycott on Zionist production.
i.

The local committees should organize
boycott propaganda in cooperat ion with
variouslocal media of information.

j.

The loca l comm·i ttees sho.u ld submit to
the permanent boycott

co~mittee,

in

Cairo, a monthly prog ress report.
The Council of the i rab League approved the recommendations of the permanent boycott committee.57

.'

57~., Resolution No. 190, 7th session, 6th meeting,
(October 1.5, 1947), p. 44.

.5J
ln spite of thc ' efforts of the permanent boycott
commit tee, the boycott did' ·not fully accomplish its·

...

objectives at this' stage for · the follo >·I ing reasons:

1.

... lthough the Council of ·the _:\rab League recommended the establishment· of local committees
in each member state, not all such committees
were established. · Hhere the' responsibility of
implementing the boycott resolution was left
to the various branches of .government, without
the supervision of a local·

com~ittee,

the boy-

cott machinery wus completely ineffective.
:

In some cases, economic considera tions took
"" '

. l .·

j

•

• '

\

precedence over political ones,

Other con-

siderations, such as the Jshortage of trained
civil serva nts and budgetary limitations,
prevented the establishment of loca l committees.

2.

In addition to the ineffectiveness of the
local committees, the permanent committee was
hampered by its own inefficiency in the early
stage and by the inherent difficulties of
maintaining an effective boycott.
I

..;

.

.

.

Thus, for

~

example·, a number of indus t ries in Palestine

were forei gn owned, yet mnnaged and
by Jewish l abor.

operE~. ted

The permanent committee did

not exteud the boycott to include these non-

Jewish owned factories.

54
Furthermore. the permanent committee did not
foresee the possibility of Jewish manufacturers• exporting products to Ar a b countries
through such neighbors as Cyprus, Turke y and
Greece

a~d

importing Arab raw ma terials through

the same channels .

J. Since the trade between Palestine and the
other Arab couhtries excluded only Palestinian
Jews while encouraging trade with Arabs in
Palestine, it was impossible, at this stage,
to make certain that raw materials, destined
for Ar abs in Palestine, did

not, in some

cases, reach the Jewish industries.
The opposition of the Briti sh authorities
to the boycott further hindered its
effectiveness.58

58League of Arab States - Secretariat General, Minutes
of ~ Meeting of the Seventh Regular Session of the
Council of the League of the Arab States , (October 7, 1947February 22 , 1948).
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THE aoYCO'.rT ·op ISRAEL ,

Due to the crisis of May 15, 1948, which r esulted in
the creation of the stute of I s rael, the permanent boycott
committe e, in Ca iro, stopped its a ctivities.

The Arab

states feltj however, that the continua tion of the boycot
would be one of the most effective tools agc inst the newlycrea ted state of Israel. • ·consequently, 1'n 1 ts
of May 19, 1951, tho Gouncil of the Ar a b

11-~oth

r~ague;

the recommend."ltion of the Political Oommittee of

se ss ion

acting on
tht~

-Loue,ue

(August 19.50), ndopted a resolution establishing regional

offices in each of the mernber sta tes

~under

the supervision

of a main office in Damascus·; $yria.
1his office was directed by a commissioner general,
appointed by the· Secretary General of the League, as sisted
by liaison officers from every Arab country. - The -latter

were appointed by the r e spective home

~overnrnents.

'lbe objective of this ne\.of syste L'l \iUS·· to organize dif-

ferent ways nnd means of putting the boycott into effect.
·rhe text of tho resolution lfas a s follows:

1.

Noting the resolution of the Political
Committee. of llugust, 19.50, e nd the

.•

57
necessity for its hasty imp,lementation,
machinery must be established for
organization and planning

~he

o~ meas~:res ,1whioh

will reG.l ize the boycott of Israel.
This machinery should consist of a comrais'

sioner appointed by the Secretary Genera l of
'

.

the Arab League •
·The Commissioner Nould be assisted by represen tatives appointed from each of the
member states.

The commissioner should be

appointed within one month, his assistants,
within two months, and the whole machinery
should be in operation within three months.
2.

The commissioner

sh~uld establi~h

office in Damascus, Syria 1
the main
of the

off~.ce

a main

The function of

would be ... the coordination

aqtivit~es

of the regional offices

toward the realization of the boycott.
Ia<;J:in office would assure the
the · b~ycott

).

on

th~

regional

The

conti~uation
l~~el.

The Commissioner should . invite the liaison
•'

,J

..

•

.officers (who would otherwise head
. the
\.

regional ..offices)
to Uleet with him at any
·~
desi~ated

place, when he deems such

conference necessary.

~

.c

of
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4.

~ach

member nhould establish a · sepa rate

office {reg iona l) to be ade quately staf fed
a..'td.

equipped ih order to perform its function

satisfactorily. · .

.5.

·'

'fhe regional off ices will ' bc · in constant

conta ct with the commissioner and the ma in
office in orde r to r e ceive

informat io~

nnd

instructions from the Commissioner, who will
supervise ·thes e offices·. . · :, 1•
6.

The Council of the Arab Ltwgue recommends

that each member f:ltat·e provide every

1 ·

f a cility to the stnff of the r egional office
in order t o expedite 'the

' '.:TOl''k'

i.1 s·

the Com-

missioner seeu fit.

7.

'l'he Commi ss ioner should submi t monthly
reports on the a ctivities of the offices and

their ·employees to the Secre~uriat Genera l
of · the Arab Len5\le which will imr:;edi a t e ly

transmit the report:·j to the met.1ber c overn-

mcnts und · the Council of the League.

The

Co"mmissioner • a t his d iscretiort, or upon ..
request from the 'Secre taria.t, should submit

. ,,

special report . :; on pul.. ticu l a r c o.Des; these
sp~aial '

reports ·-should be sent by the

Commissioner to the reg iona l offices dlrectly.
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8.

'rhe Council of the League recommended that
e u.ch member state regulate its foreign trade,
paying attention to Israel's efforts to overcome the boycott, by using foreign countries
for transit of Israeli goods destined for
Arab countries and Arab raw materia l destined
for Israel.

9.

The Council of the Arab League recommends that
the member should, through legislation and
administrative procedures, take \'lhatever steps
are necessary for the implementation of the
resolution and prosecute whoever violates the
adopted legislation by

de<~ing

with the

Israelis.
In accordance with the above resolution, the Secretary
General of the Arab League appointed a Commissioner, and an
appropriate staff was selected from the

~ecretariat

General

of the League • 59
Through the Commissioner, the machinery of the boycott
was established, and the liaison representatives, fcorn the
reg ional offices,met with the Commissioner for their first
conference on November J, 1951. · This was the beginning of

59Hesolutions, No. 357, 14th Session, 4th meeting,
01ay 19, 1951), pp. 78-79.
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the second stage of the Arab boycott.60

,. ·

'fhe main boycott office and .the \regional off' ice, after
a thorough study of the problem, .a greed upon two types of
boycott:

the first, the boycott of Israel, directly and

indirectly; the second, hindering the development of Israeli
economy.

.•

\.

I'

'_ilHE BOYC.Q11.

9F ISRAEL , DIRECTLY

AND INDIHECTLY

The principle of the boycott of Israel was based upon
the prohibition of all commercial relations between Israel
and the member states of the Arab League. · This applied to
the

importi~g

of agricultural, manufactured or nny other

commodity from Israe l to the Arab countries <md the export
to Israel of r :nv ma teri?.ls and foodstuffs.
'l'he applica tion cf the boycott took t!vO forms.

The

dire ct met:iod involved direct trade botwoen Israel and
Arab countries.

The s econd was aimed at ony indirect

trade using a foreign country

~s

en intermedia ry between the

Ar a b countries and Israel.
1.

Direct l1ethod of the . Boycot.t Q£ Israel
In order tQ realize the boycott directly, .
the raa in office rmd the lia ison boycott officers

60t1inutes of ~ meeting of the Council of the Arab
League~~~ 15th regular. session (October J-13, 1951r;--

61
submi t te{r ·r ecommendB·tions conc·erning the
boycott tc the Counc tl of the r'- r a b Lea g ue.
Once o.p proved by' th'e~ Counc'il ,· these r e comIOe ndc;~ ioils

COncerning ·the boycott to the

1\rnb Le ague, the r e comme nda tions were put
in to effect by the me mbe r gov ernments.
'.(he measures emplo'ye<r· in ·the d irect boyc ott
of Isrnel 1o11ere
a.

th~

following: · · :·

1\ll means or t r Ansportat i on beh1een
Ir3rael and 'the Ar a b countries \\'ere
controlle d .' ·· Ships and a irlines Nece
pr ohibitea rr·om· stoppine at
~Jort

any~ .'i.r~b

if", during a roundt r i p , they ha d

violat i on of this rule re s ulted in
the shi p beinl p l a ced. on
bl acklis t .
at te ~~t

<1

; erme.nent

Should such a ship ever

to stop at an ( Arub port, it would

be r~ f ased a~m i ss ion .61
b.

I n orde r to prevent the trrms f er of
money from the . r ab count ries,
,; ,..

cont~ols

st~ict

were p l a c ed on a ll b nnk i ng and

61 :1esolution No . 560, 18th Se ss ion, J r d meeti"'1g ,
meeting, April 9, 1953, p. 128.

·.·
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Any

other channels of exchange.
individua l attempting to. make

illegal transfers of money wa s
prosecuted by la\'1 1 and any concern, .
involved in the illegal transfer of
money, wa s closed.
c.

Lists and information regarding a ll
known or suspected smugglers were
provided by the boycott ma chine ry,
to all relevant departments of
g overnments, especially to t h8t
concerned with the issuing of import and
export licenses.
The ma in boycott office wa s r equired
to prepa re black-lists of a ll
convicted smugglers, for distribution
to all concerned departments of member
governments.

d.

In order to prevent Israel and individuals from taking advantage of the long
borders separating Israel and the Arab
countries and

the ~ seapo ast,

s ~rict

border controls, both mechanica l and other,
were intensified. . In additL)n, t l1c flow
of goods to border a reas wa s

,regul~ ted

63

s o as to' prevent a surplus of ma terial
which could be profita bly smuggled
into Israel. ~' ·

2.

~h~

•

'

~

!• .

L
Indirect Method of the Boycott of I srael

Realizing tha t direct trade was not the
only means of excha nge between Israel and
t he Arab St a tes, ' the boycott ~nchinery
c:=illed attention to the follo wing
possibilitie s through which Israel might
j

I

£ (

atte mpt to overcome, ·to s ome extent , t he
direc t boyc'o t t ·of t r ade.
a.

Indire ct imp6~tgtion of Ara b fo odstuffs 9nd ra1"1 mate rials t o

..

Unable to secure the necessa ry
imports. from ~he Arab countries
Isra~l

directly,
using such

--

resorted to

~~ ighboring
'

c.ountries

a s, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and
Ita ly as inter mediary routes
'

'

.

of trade between the Arab
countries

a~d

Israel.

The boycott

machinery took the following
preventive measures against the
indirect importation ot: foodstuffs
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and raw ma terials .to
'

•

(1)

Is~ael.

...

'

..

• •

l

•

...

r•

All .ma teria
ls needed
by
Israel
I
.
• .. \
•
•
.
'
require~
I

licenses, for export from

•

the

A list of

A~a~ countri~s.

all foodstuff
s andI raw materials
•
in this category wa s prepared.
·~

-· •

..

• f

It was stipulated
. . tha t before'
receiving a license, an exporter
must give a
f

•

that

gu~rantee
l. .

• ••

:

.

certification from the proper
'

~uthority,
\

Arab

6.

.

and indica ting

Consulat~.
l.

by the

~otarized

-

._

• •

I

that the goods had been
·~

c~:msumed

I

••

in the

cou~1try

to

which
it wa s' consigned,
would
t
• •
• '£hese
.,, be forthcoming
.'
'f" ,,
regulations applied equally
\ \ l

..

t.,

• '

#t

to the Arab free zone.
I

regional offices were

The
requir~d

to submit weekly reports of all
materials exported, to the
above mentioned countries, in
I

Yo

.

order to determine
whether the
.
quantities received, from
va~ious

..

Arab sources, were

consumed in the countries to

6.5
which they had been consigned.

In

this way a further check was possible.
(2) The CoUncil recommended to each
member state that economic agreement
between an Arab state and any foreign
state should includ a clause prohibiting the re-export of Arab goods to
Israe1.6 2
{J) 'lhrough diplomatic channels, Arab

governments should inform foreign
countries of the importance the Arabs
attach to the smuggling of either
Lrab or Israeli goods, through
foreign countries to Israel and Arab
countries, respectively.6J
(4) The boycott apparatus established
special regulations of trade between
arab countries and the neighboring
countries such as Cyprus and Turkey
which were suspected of re-exporting
Arab goods to Israel.
b.

Indirect exportation of manufactured goods
from Israel to the Arab countries.

62 Ibid

-·

6Jrbid.
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The boycott apparatus considered the possibility of Israel's overcoming the· boycott
against exports from · Israel to .· the Arab
countries by sending her, goods to a free
zone or to a foreign country for further
processing and re-export under a foreign
label.

To prevent this indirect exporta-

tion of Israeli ·produots to the Arab world,
the boycott machinery took the following
measures:
(1)

-..

. .... ,

-

~

..1

To prevent- the - import of Isreli
goods through foreign countries to
the Arab states, lice11ses were
required· for all goods, whatever·
their origin.

In addition, to the

import licenses,

· a ~ certificate

of

origin from the chamber of commerce
or industry

of~ a

foreign country

with the' notarization of the Arab
consulate in that country• was.,•
required.
(2)

Al~

• ... J

. ..
...

' ..'

.

~

trade agreements , between Arab

and foreign• countries must include
a clause prohibiting the export to
the Arab countries of goods of
~.

Israeli origin of goods which had,
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· in· ·any· degree," been· produced, added
to or' changed by· I-sraeli 'labor•·64
(J)

·In."order ·to· ;faci\litate the boycott
work of the concerned departments of
Arab countries, the · machinery made
available lists of all goods exported
by Israel to all

fore~gn

countries.

'l'he lists 'consisted ·' of three· categories:
The first category included all
goods

e~ported

from Israel to the

foreign countries which the l a tter
did not itself produce in king. · The
goods in this· ca tegory were not
be

to

imported to the Arab states from

that country. '" ,
The second categorY- included goods
produced in

a

foreign country, in a

limited quantity, thus requiring
importation of this same· product
.from Israel, for its

own

consumption.

~·/hen suffici ent proof was provide'd

indicating that g'o ods in this
category h~d- been produced in the
foreign- country ; the

..

-·

64Ibid

i

~rab

•. It

countries
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could import such goods.
I

~

The third ~~tegor~ included goo~s
produced in

~he

foreign country

but not produced in Israel in an
amot.:nt \'lhich would peru.it export.
~h~se

goods could be imported by

/, rab countries.
( 4) :Ul goods imported to the Ar&b

zones would come under the same re-

striations as goods i mported to the
Ar ab countries.

(5) Specia l regulutions were ina~1t.uted
concerning t.hree countries.
c~se

In the

of Gyprus and l'urkey , \'lhose

geoe rephicnl proximity to Israel and
the .•r a b

countrie~

ma de trede

rela tively eusy and inexpensivE!,
mea oureo were taken to prevent
Israel's establishing trade bases. -1

Because of German revaration to
lsraelis, spec1ul restrictions were

placed -upon riest German imports.
(a)

Imports f.!:2m ~~vrus - Only
products produced in

..

~y prus

icselt', and no t produced . by
Israel were accepted for

import by the Arab· countries.
Alx Oyprus-prouuceu•·imports
1•e'q uired a ' certifioate of origin
from the chamber of commerce
or the Union of· Commerce and
Industry and a notarization by
the government of Cyprus and
the concerned Arab Corlsulate in
Cyprus .6.5
(b)

Imports · from Turkey- Imports
from Turkey must be accompanied
by a certificate of origin which
includes a clause stating that
the product had in no way been
changed or added to of I sraeli
products or labor.

The cer- .,

tificates issued by the Turkish
authorities or the chamber of • ·
commerce, required the notarization of the concerned Arab .,.
consulate.66

...
65Ibid., Res. i{o. 68.5, 20th Se s sion , 8th meeting,
J anuary 27, 1954 , pp. 160-161.
,. . .
I

f,

'

66nesolutions, No. 1077, 24th Session, 4th meeting,
Novembe r 15, 1955 , p. 251 .
.
~

r

1 - ··.
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(c)

Imports from West Germany - ln
order, to prevent Israel 1 s selling materials. received through
the German Repa.rn.tion program,,
to the Arab countries, ..( t hrough
other countries) the folloNing
measures were t Hken:
{1}

Unless tho, importer proved
beyond a doubt that the
goods of West uerman
origin imported from other
·countries were not reparation. goods, these goods

could not be imported to
,...

the . Arab countries.

(2) . Importers bringing goods
r ·,

from Uest Germany must present

certificates from the proper
West ~ German

authorities and

the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry and notarized by the
concerned Ar a b consulate
stating thnt the goods came
directly from the producer in
Germany <md were not a part of
the Israeli reparation

71
.. · goods.67
{d)

Products of Foreign Industries
in l'lhich lsrae 1 or 1nd1vidual

J.

Israel1s -own stock, partiully or
entirely.

Having noticed that

both Israel e nd
·'

individu~ l

Israelis \oJere investing abroad,

by participating in certa in ,
foreign industries, the Ar a b
countries took necessary
mea sures to prevent the products
of these industries f'rom reaching the 1irab ma rket.

Such

products, having a foreign
(non-Israeli) origin, would
otherwise not have been

·. :
'

.. .

! :

restricted.

Industries · of this

kind were e t> tablished in 'furkey,

for example.
'l'he .. rub
'

..

staten p2 sse d legisla-

'

tion clnss iPying the following
.. 'r.

products in the s nrne category

67~., !~eG. :~o. 6ne ,

Janua ry 27,

19.5l~,

pp. 162-16).

20th

~~es s lon, 8th m~eting,

72

..

as lsrael~., gp~~~: al:l· products prq_- !:! ...
d~ced ou t sid~-<.lsrae_l,
Israel:_, ,f ls z:ae~.is,

o.\!D.ed ':!Y

persons living in

Israel,
organizations.
...
. .. in Israel,..,
~

.

Israeli . ag~nts {or rpersons
. ... .serving

· . ·.

the int.e.r~st ~f Israe,l. 68

·: .. ,

~ionist . Capital . ~

(e)
·.,.,._.

~

~

t

.\·Jhile ,encouraging

foreign investment in Arab economics,

1.

investig~y ions •.9-n

..

in 9rder . to

p~event Zioni~t

i.n the

ope.r~~int?

from

l £oreign capital.

~rab

capital

wo_!•ld , .

ana thereby controllD1g Arab

and

e~onom~~~
\

.

,.,

\

di~ecting th~m

Z io~~s t _.go~l~ J

...

4

l

ec .·Ji.: '" r·

...

I

~

~

.. l

toward

--

,

HINDEHING !!.ill .DEVELOH1ENT 0~ filE I SHAELI ECOHOMY

The boycotF of

Isr~eli . trade

with the Ar a b

wo~6d

did

make its mark on the Israeli economy. . Hot1ever, 1 t did not
strangle that economy, the

doq~s

of non-Arab countries

being of course open to her.

•

<-

- •

•.
.:

-

t..

68Econom1c Council of the .~rab' Le ague-First regular
se ~: sion, December j_, lill-July _,22, 1954 , p. 506 • .-1 ~he
unified law of Arab Boycott, Article II •
.

.

..., ,.

•

.

-

...

" ·

v

.,

-" ~

-

L

·~ · ~

..

--.: •• 't.. ~r · ~e

'-".:· . ~

u .. ..,ta1
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Israel was developing her economy through ·l and reclamation, irrigation and industrializa tion.

Through her

a gricultural and industrial development, Israel was able to
overcome to some extent the existing unemployment and to
provide employment for the constant flm1 .,.o f

irmni ~runts.

Such a development progr a m required· cons·iderable c apital
not ava ilable in Israel; the refore, Israel encouraged
foreign investments.
At the same ti1ne Israel trie d ·to overcome her trRde
difficulties by importing foodstuffs and raw materia l from
non-Arab countries and by e xporting her manufactured

.1

products to .,.sian and •\frican markets, or any othe r underindustrialized country.

•

The boycott apparatus decided that i ts efforts must

be extended in order to impede Israel's trade and economic
relations with other countries.

To t his end the Ar a b

League adopted the folloNing measures.
l.

Discouragin ·:.> t he flO"t'f o f

fore1 i~n

ca pftal to

Israel and encourag i n,.; nlrea dy invns ted
capita l to wi t;hdraw.
Using the Zion i st move.1:ent t =.. - i .2fluence

-vwrld J-e.,;ry anJ. , tha t, Jev1ry L1

~ urn,

to

influe nce b m .1b: i n0 house s , i Hdus tries a nd
individua ls, es~.Je ci :.:..l ly i n th e United Sta tes,
Israel

h~d

been

~ b le

tc encour age substa ntial
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foreign

inv~stment.

Wi th !the assurance of

attractive terms. ,of investment, industries
had

establish~ d

c~n:tcrs

distribution
2.

,branches, ,assembly plants,. and
in _Israel._ '"' ·.

•I

I

l

The Arab poycott machinery took the necessa ry

steps to lead

cert~in ,An~~stries

to drop their

plans for iD;vcs.t ment in . ~srae.l·· and some already
establish~d

..

industries, to liquiqate their

Israeli operations and to
from Israel,.

Th~se , 41ea~ures

machinery poohibited
the

\'li

thQ.raw all capital
taken by the boycott

import by tho Arabs of

t~~

following l compan~e~ :

a. . Firms that had branch factorie s in Israel.69

.

Firms that had a ssembly plants in .Israel,

b.

or firms wpose a gents assembled their
products in Israel.70
c • . Firms thb.t pad agencies or .main o.( fic;:es

in Israel for their Middle Eastern

··-

operations.?!

69iiesolutions, Ho. 560, 18th Se s sion, Jrd meeting,
April 7, 195J, p. 128 .

71Ibid., Res. No. 935, 2Jrd Se ssion, 2nd meeting,

Jl , 1955,

.,

~-

226 .

..

... .

'

,.

d.

Firms that give patents, trade· marks, copyrights, etc., to Israeli companies.??

e.

Firms and private or public organ izations

that purchase sha res in Israeli compa nies or

.. .

factories.7J
f ..

~

Technical or consultant firms tha t offer
their services to I srael. 7 1 ~

·,

'fhe Ara b co)zlntries informed the foreign .. governments of
these measures through their regula r diploma tic channels.
The Arab boycott offices informed the specific industries
having branches, etc., in Israel that they must choose, with=
in a period of not more •than tnree mon ths, to terminate their

operations in Israel and reta in

'~heir-

branche s in the Ar ab

countries and the n rab ma r l(et for t he ir prod. ucts , or continue in Israel and lose the .ir a b mCirke t

and

di :;;continue their

1\rab operations.
In order to ·encourage the esta blishment in the ar ab
world of foreign industries taa t left Is r ael, t he Ar ab

72Ibid., Hes. lJo. 560, 18th Se s sion , Jrd mee ting ,
April 9, 1953, p. 128.
7Jibid., Hes., No. :.684, 2oth Session, 8th meeting ,
January 27, 1954, p. 161.
74Ibid.
7.5rbid.., Hes.,. No. 692, 20th Session, 8th meeting,
J anuary 2(, 1954 , p . 16) .
J.
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League

recom~ended

that Arab countries offer

th~

most

~

favorable encouraecment to .these forei gn industries. 7.6

u.

f he necessity, creAted by the. Arab ..boycott, of

Israel's going to othe r countries, often at some distance,
for r a.\'1 ma tef'ia ls, foodstuffs and

111arket~:

for her own

products, led the Arab Leac.:;ue 1to recomnend thHt Arab
countries secure needed raw materia ls from the

s~me

source Isra el used ancl compete with Israeli products in
foreign markets.

'l"he Arabs \iere able to compete favorably,

both in imports and exportn, with the Israelis, due to low
costs of production.77

..; . t

'r.
PE J AL'l'IB~

FOR BOYCOTT VIOLA? I. OHS

I n the be0 i rmiu g of t he
st<.:..te s ena cted

~he i r O \·lll

boyc o ~ t

t he individual Arab

l (J.WS r-t.wl r e 1.5ulrit ions con cerning

smugg line,; un ti a ny uthe r t ype of violat i on of the boycott.
These l m1s v ar ied in

de ~ree,

but in g ene r a l they were

l e nie nt, and i n s ome count ries did not exis t .

Realizing

t h is, the boycott m8.Ci.1ine ry recomme n ded to t he Arab League
the n e cessity o f esta blishinb unified boycott legislation
to be appl-ied -in e e.ch rr~ember s t <>.te.

76Ib'
. .,... ,
~
Janua ry

r.
.~ e s .

"l·,' o.

7!'\1
· s s 1 on , °.}th mee t 1ng
•
·..;., ,_'? Q ...., h _e
,

27, 1954, :pp. 169-lf$0.
" '?

.

..

'-

( Ibid., Hes. rJo.'

195 ~ , VP •

165-166.

,This leg isle,tion was

~

69.3, 20th Session, January 27,

.

,

drafted and adopted at the 20th mc etitl5 of the e conomic
council ofthe
11, 1954.'18

ltre:.~b

i.eague a nd. ap.tJroveu by it on Decer11ber

Each member sta te

or

the Lea(;Ue agreed u pon

the leg islation.
The unified law prohibited any de c.lings with Israe l,

includ ing the lsraeli government, institution s or group s,
Israelis, pers ons living in Isr•ael c-..ud. those l'mrkin0 in the
interest of Isra el--either

di~:•eotly

or in<.iirec t ly.

In

genera l, the l a w restricted. &11 foreign t raci..e and
specified the comaoditie s considered Isr&eli in nature.
The unified l a w contBine<i a penalty 0f forced l o bor f or
fl

period of not less than three

ye:::.r~

ar:d not

~Lore

than

te n ye t?trs Rnd. for n fine of not more than. 5,000 Egyptian
p ounds (or the equiva lent).79

In any case, the

merohP.n dise, ns well as the involved. me ans or transportation, would be seized by the 80Vernment.

The law a l-

lotted 20 per cent of the va lue of the merchandise
seized to the informer whose informa tion led to the
arrest or to the officials responsible for making the
arrest.

78_r.conomic Deoartment_ of tr~. League of Arab S tatesCow1cil, ~ecember .,5., 1953-

~ession of the i.::conomic
Julz 22, ~. pp . 506-508.

Pirst

'19Collection of ;the l ~e_s_olution of the Council of the
League of the Arab ~tatiS7 p. 2 07 •
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'!'HE BOYCOTT _IU ,OPERA'fiON
THE

ORG~\NIZATION

vF THE, DOYCO'f:t' APPAllA'r US

The first commissioner of the Boycott apparatus wes
l

Genera l Haheed Sha.wky, Director of the Coast Guard and

..

Cus totils Gua.rds of Egypt.

General Shawky wa's cho sen in the

light of his knowledge of smuggling. and his contacts with

.

,.

customs officia ls in the Arab capitals.80
i •

I

On

•

June 1', 19.5i, immediately after his appointment,
\

General Shawky ' set up the ma in office of the boycott
.
..
machinery 1n~ Damascus and toured the Arab states in order
to encourage the establishment of the local boycott offices.
I

,

I

\

General Shawky and his staff made a study of the most
.

~

effective ways of con trolling the Arab borders with Israel
I

f

-"'I\,

•

"

and contacted the i'1 1nistries of Foreign Affnirs with

.
.
requests for the following information:
l.

l

•

'

The extent and incedents of smuggling between
, •.

the Arab statea and Israel, in either direction.
80neport Q!l the Activit~ of the !Jecretariat General
.Q£ the Leagl.!e 2f. ~ St~ between~ lOtll lim.!! the 18th
Sessions ·rrom ,Maroh 17th.~ 12 Maroh ·g&. ~. Report
.Q!:. the 15th Sesoion.

79
2.

Lists of persons, companies,.. and organizations
involved

in - smu-~gling

Israel.

J.

.:. l

activities to and from
. . ...

The economic situation in Isrnel and Israeli

needs for Arab
4.

..,

produ~s.

The condition of Israeli industry and ·the j
type of products which might be exported to
the Avab tworld.

5. Penalty

~

in ~ each

·

Arab codntry for individuals

involved in smuggling between Israel and the
Arab countr1es.81
The relations between the main office in Damascuo and
I

'

the newly organized., local offices were such as to ensure the
necessary cooperation for the affective implementation of'
the boycott.
'rhe main office of the boycott was responsible to the
Council of the League of Arab States for the execution of
the boycott.

The main office consisted of legal experts,

.. ,

economists, attaches, and secret informers.

It worked

in cooperation with the various departments of the Arab
~

r

... '.

League especially the economic and the Public Information
departments
•
...

..

t . ,~

.·

, .

~

81Ibidl, Report QB ~ ac~ivity of ~ ~ office

g.£. the boycott, dated September

.,.
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The main office submitted a report every six months
to the Arab League concerning its activities and those of
the local offices.

In addition, . occasional

submitted when necessary.

•r

repo~ts

were

....

1

Every .local office had i t s own apparatus consisting
of employees .and informers • . The local offices worked in
cooperation with the local departments concerned such as

. ..

customs, police, security, and •others.
'fhey also worked in cooperation
a ttaches in their

missionmroad~
\

..

I

j I

·• '

•

1be Activitx of the Boycott Apparatus
J

The

I

I

economic

with ~< the

•

•

\

I

office concentra ted on permanent

~in

re s~arch

of the Israeli economy with emphas is on commerce and
l.i

indus try, agriculture, wa ter developme nt, e tc.

It also

\'ratched closely the economic and financi a l rela tionships
between I s rael and other countries.

Reports were

circula ted to local offices and departments, loca l lia i s on
officers were invited usually twice a yea r, to conferences
for a thorough discus sion of all aspects of the boycott.
l•1 ethods employed, results, new situa tions and possibilities,
etc., were explored.

Recommendations were presented to

the Arab League Council and/or to the Economic Council of the
Ar a b League. ·

J: .

''

..

.. '

Incidents of. viola tion of the boycott were investigat ed
and tried by the local .a uthorities.

A ll ' i~ormation

on the

81

incidents was sent - by the local boycott offices to the
main office for further investigation.

If the main office

found the case a valid violation, the information was sent
to all the local

o f fices ~ and

the . persons involved were

placed on the black list. · ..

'l • ~

The activity of the boycott organization could be
summarized as follows: ·
1.

Hatching the local market and the possibilities
of smuggling between the Arab States and
Israel~

petty · incidents of smuggling of

Israeli merchandise by individual Arabs took
place here and there. 'and smugglers were
punished through seizure of the merchandise.
Through its agents in foreign countries the
I

•

main office investigated the consumption of
Arab products to determine whether such
I

products were re-exported to Israel.
2.

Foreign Companies - The main boycott office
placed on a black list all companies which
had violated the boycott regulations.

No

Arab country was permitted to dea l with
such companies.

..

.-

Before such companies were black-listed they
were given three months in which to comply
with the boycott regulations . and thus avoid

82
the black-list. .N.eny companies which
black-listed discovered that

the 1 l~s~

r

w~r~

qf the

Arab market was not economically justified
by the gain of .the Israeli..marke·t

~.

·. ..

..t

_

; ·

Consequently, tbey complied .with the boycott
regulations, and their names
from the bla ck list.·, . ,
).

we~e

removed
. '

,·

r,oreigp. t1aritime Companies ·- No foreign
passengers nnd car go ships with regula r Ar ab

-

.

ports of ca ll were allowed to stop at an
I

Israe li port during one round trip.

The

only exception to the rule was for international tourist ships.82
Ships carrying strategic military material
to Israel or hired by Israel or an Israeli
citizen were black-listed.

Ships so black-

listed, ha ving occasion to stop a t an Arab
port, would receive no water, food or other
services.

Should the necessary guarantees

be

presented to the boycott office, a blacklisted ship could be removed from the list.
~he boycot~

Should such a ship violate

a·

second time, it ·would be permanently black-

-------l-·

l'

•

'

82Report .QQ ~ activity 2£ the main office and ~
loca l offices 2[ ~ boyco t t ~ ~ first ~ gf !221,
p. 8
0
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listed with no opportunity for clearance., , A
·: .
substru1tial number of bl~ck-listed ships have
\.

~·

•

'

J.

been removed from the list.
4.

Airline Companies - Foreign
..
-airline ' companies
..
having main office, branches or agents in any
~

of the Arab States that did not obey this
regulation, would receive . neither permission
to land nor to fly over Ar.ab

terr~tories.

It is to be noted that no violation of the
above regulation has occurred.

However, Air
I

France has been black-listed, not because of a
violation pertaining to air flights, bu't
because of violations against the general
rules· for foreign companies.
,

'fhe violations

...

committed by Air France we're due to its
..
.
investments in Israel, its membership in the
joint French-Israeli Chamber of Commerce,· and
its hesftation in providing for Ar ab tourism
in the ·way it provided for Israeli tourism.
\fhen Air France made the prope'r adjust""ments
•

·

I

•

., I

and followed the boyco t t regulations 1 'it
'

'

l

•

!

.

.....

\'lf.I.S

talien off the· blahk-list and. its' planes were
1:-e rmittcd to land in and fly ov'e r Arab territories.8J

.·
8JReport Q[ ~ Secretary General ~ the Council of the
League Q( Arab States - in ~ 30th Session, October 1958,
,

p.

51.

( .

J

•

..
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5.

Motior1 picture,

so~~d reco~ding

and publica tions -

The boycott a ppnratua watched all import of
movies, records, books,

m~gazines ~.:nd

ne\fiSpapers

and black-listed the follovsi.ng categories of

information media:

a.

Everything produced.

b.

~1ovies

il1

Israel or by

Isr<;~ eli s .

starring, directed or produced by

Isra elis or individua ls knmm to have·
contributed in any way ·t;o t he welfa r e of
Israel.

c.

'·

Records presenting pro-Israel sentiments
or fe a turing Israeli artists or persons
...

knot.vn to have contributed to the welfare or
Israel.
d..

Publications which, aftei• publishing pro ...

Israel articles or avticles of a derogatory
natur e about Arabs, refused to publish a
corre sponding

~rticle

in the interost

or

the Arnbs.

6.

Petroleum - 'l'he Arabs prohibited the flow ofpe troleum

originatutg in any Arab country to Israel, either
directly or indirectly.

The boycotting of this

essential commodity caused an increa sed in the
price of Israeli industial products.
Although Iurael was abla to obta in oil from

85
Venezuela, Rumania, USSR, and Iran, .the expense
of transportation over long distances raised the
price of the oil.

Even in the case of nearby

Irnn, the closure of the Suez Canal to s uch
essential shipments to Israel made it necessary
to transport the oil by pipeline from Elath to
the refinery in Haifa.
l

~

The initial cost of the

'(·•

'"

', ,...

pipeline through the aesert, not to mention
the additional cost of ouch a transport
opera tion, counter-acted any advantage obta ined
from the purchase of Iranian oil.

(

'.fhe existing pipeline betvfeen Arab oil field's
directly to the Haifa refinery has not been
'

•

•

•

f

,

~

•

,

permitted to operate under the boycott
regulations.
. . ..
\

l

I

'

.

-

•;,

:

The oil that Israel receives from other sources
is not sufficient, not is the supply regular
enough, to insure . efficient operation of the
refinery.

7.

L

Suez Canal - In order to fulfill the a ims of
Arab boycott, Egypt prohibited the passage of
Israeli vessels or of' goods destined for ·
Israel through the Suez Canal.

'1.

Egypt con~

sidering itself in a state of war with Israel,

86
acted in accordance with .the provisions· of
Article 10 of the Constantinople· Convention
·,

of 1888.

The Constantinople Convention provided that the
Cana l must remain free and open to a ll shipping,

. ....

in time of war as well as in _time
•.,

o~

peace.
·'

Article 10 of this trea ty, however, gives
'

Egypt the right to t a ke mea sures necessary to
.

:'

it s defense.
When Israel complained to the Security Council,
the latter adopted a resolution , on September
1, 1951, in which it "calls upon Egypt to
terminate the restrictions on the pa ssage of
internationa l commercial shipping and goods
through the Suea Canal whenever bound and to
cea se all interference with such shipping
beyond tha t e s sential to the s afety of s hipping
in the Ca na l itself and to observance of
international conventions in force.84
It must be recalled in this connection that the
Security Council based its resolution not on
a lega l interpreta tion of the 1888 Convention,

84yea r Book of the United Nations, 1951, p. 299.

87 -

an interpret&tion which the Council is not
competent to make, but in the desire of the
Council for a ·ttpeaoeful ~ settlement" between
Egypt

and . Isra~l.

Now this · resolution is

one of more than 70 resolutions adopted by
different organs of the t United . . Nations
respect to the · Palestine problem.

:~ith

This is the

only resolution with which the Arabs have not
complied, and the only one Israel is willing
to accopt.85
Horeover, Egypt claims the.t its action is
justified in terms of the inherent right to
self-defense, a right which cannot. be curtailed
by invocation of the 1888 convention.

Egypt

claims that she cazmot be expected to allow
an integral part of its territory to be used
by

a coWltry with \ihich she is a t war in

order to reinforce the military potential·· of
that country.
•..
On July 18, 1957, Egypt declared her acceptance

of the jurisdiction of the International Court

asPoud
·- · Mos

'hi,

~·

cit., p. 171.

88
of Justice.

She s&reed that uny unresolved

differences amonc; the sit; I1<'•tor1es over the

mee.nin$ of the Constantinople Convention of
1888, guarantoc41g freedom oi' navigation .in

the Canal, shall be refer•red to .the Inter-.
national Cow•t.86

Esypt. asserted hez· willing-

!!e ss to he. ve the . rna t ter of Isr&el ship plug
refe~red

8.

..

to the World Court.

'

Boycott frO!.fagand.a - The Eoycott e1Jpnrntus, n

rela tively small
I

orguni~ation,

'

.

face d. certuin

difficulties in the initial st&ges of its
operations.

In the first place, instea d of

-

deHling with one stote, it hu.d to

l<~ork

with

I

eight Arab States (now 10 mem~rs and two
non-members of the

ft~ab

Leegue ) under dif-

ferent circumstances, both economic and
political.

'l'he national conaciousnos u differed from one
Arab sta te to Hnother.

'f horcforc, it

wa~ fo~

the main boycott office to initiate a campaign
th~ough

various socia l, cultural and

86united Nntions General Assemql):, A/ J 576/adu.,l,
S/J817/add.l, July 2) , 19)7.
·.'2t ..... ·... t
~
... , .. ,.l-·-·

- . ..

'

.-

...

....

\ .. ~

89
politiccd org.:,nlza tiur.;.f; in the ·.re b world in

order to educf.l t!t t l·:e people tow;.; rd
ot ~ z:dir-e~

( Kul

~n

unde r -

of the importance of the boycott.

I·~ owa ten

.Kh;)f e er) in

Dnmt~ ~cus ,

Syria, is An

example of such lm or£;an1z<l tion tlhich
ellcourage<l the people to be constantly on the

Blert for f'iny violation of' the boycott from
any q,unrter.

The main boycott office expln1.n

th~t

the boycott

was not e. matter of prejudice, but of na tional
securi t :;· for the r. r a bs.

It u!;ed for 1 ts purpose

all media. of iuformat1on-rnd1o,

pre t; ~

pumphlets,

etc., in Arabic, Pronch, and Engl1sh.87

In order to countei' the attack of Zionists Rbrond
who presented the boycott in terms cf a nti-

Semitism, the bo.}'cott office published pamphlets
than explained its vurious tneHsureo, us a. legal
means of protecting Arctb national security.

'l 'he

propaganda stressed the importance of the

neutra lity on the pa rt of foreign firms in the
Arab Israeli dispute; i.e., contribution to either side.

87Hepor:~ 2!:, the !)eereta rl Genernl to the Gouncll of
Lea gue of ftr..!:\..b. ~t1 ten in its 27th Session, Mo roh, 1957,
pp. J67-J68.
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CHAPTER VII

••

J

• •

'fHE lSilAELI REACr.riON TO 'l'HE BOYCOTT

During the e a rly ·s tages of : the Boycott, Israel
considered that measure 1 ns ?.n expression of· the state of
war existing

bet~1een

itself and the Arab stutes.

At its

beginning, in 1950, the boycott was ioplemented directly
by with\Wi>Jding . foodstuffs and · r~nT materiels from -Isra el, and

to counteract the effects of the boycott, Israel , at first,
went to foreign

.. ••

markets . for- her ~ needs.

I

Then, however, r the' Arab Leogue implemented stricter,

more indirect boycott measures, such as put.t ing pressure
upon foreign corupanies which - invested 1n Israel or helped

in any way the economy 1 of', that .country.
of the boycott

~1as

Now, the weight

felt in Israel by the withdra wa l of

several companies which ·,did- not wish · to lose the Arab
markets.88

•

'

.I

Instead, Israel resorted to world Jewry which was to
exert pressures of its

O\'m

on companies which complied

. , .. .. - __t...
l ,;"

88neport~ 2f. ~h~

Main Office of

Damascus during 1951, ~'

1221

~

~ ~.

Boycott

in

92
with Arab boycott restrictions.

Thus, when the British

Overseas Air\'lays Company decided to yield to the Ar ab
demand, and , i n 1955 liquidated. her installations in, and
service to Israel, British
refused to patronize BOAC.

~md·.\.Jestern

European Jews

The financial losses incurred

through thi s counter boycott of DOAC led the

comp~y

to

reconsider the situation. ·consequently, BOAC found a way
to circumvent the boycott and counter-boycott· by using
its affiliate, Cyprus Airways , for fli ghts to and from
Israel.89

. ..

~

,.

The continued Arab pres sure on, Foreign companies and
the l a tter•s compliance led the Zionist world congress, in
its early 1956 meeting in ·Jerusalem, to discuss the
seriousness of the Arab boycott.

The Congress declared

that "the economic institutions in Israel, in cooperation
with certa in economic institutions abroad, are preparing
a counter-boycott on the internat iona l level. • • The
purpose of the counter-boycott on · the internationa l level
is to make the Arabs . understand in practical terms that
it is possible to fight them by the same method in order to
force them to · back down."90

·.
89Haboker, Israel, August 12, 12j1, guoted in ~
periodical Bulletin No. 11, Cairo, Hovember 4, 12j1; p. 8,
Palestine office, League of Arab St a tes.
90Ibid. \• .

I.

•

•

i\.
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The orgBn ized counter-boycott by Israe l, however, did
not materia lize
the

~>hell

irnmed i ~.te ly,

and it t ook the

w ithdre:~ml

of

Oil Company and the British Petroleum Corporation

in 1957 to precipitate the forma tion of a counter-boycott.
The . withdrawal of these two l a r ge companies in the
summer of

195~

was in answer to Ara b pr essure begun after

the Sinai campaign in 1956.

Since these companies had a lmost

exclusive control of oil marketing a nd distribution in
Israel their withdrawal \'las a . blo\'t which aroused Israeli
public opinion and prompted the Israeli authorities to
establish n committee for the counter-boycott.
fhe Jewish Observer of London editorialized on this
e vent on August 23, 1951:

11

A serious prestige blow such as

the Shell and 1the British Petroleum decision to withdraw
from Israel was needed to rouse the Israeli government to
cons ider a move which it had been r eluctant to t ake for
many years a c,ounte r-boycott. n
Ara b

boycot~

was esta blished under the auspice s of the

Jewish Agency.
Ministries of

The committee against the

It included representatives of the

.

Fo~eign

Affairs.
Trade a nd Agriculture, as
-

well as leading personalities in private enterprises and
cooperative industries in Israel.

of the prodticts of- •fira s Hhich help the ·Ar nbs in the ir
economic warf&re~91
The

i~ea

behind the· Isreeli counter-boycott was

clea rly expressed by a le ading Isrr.1.eli ne\'lspaper, HEJ boker,
which stated that :

..

'

,t

• \

I:very company exposed to Arub pre ssure and
which intends to terminate its relations with
Israel must we igh the importance of the loss
of Arab trade against the los s of not only
Israeli trade but ulso the antagonism of
millions of Jews throughout the world who
wo~ld also boycott the company 's· products or ·
services." ·
11

'!he newspaper contineed:
"The companies which gave in to Arab pressure
in the past had calculated the loss of the
Israeli market only and gave no thought to
the possibility of a. boycott of world Jewry.n92
In October 1959, the Renault Company mnde a public
announcement of its cancella tion of the contract.

It seems

clear from an admission conta ined in the company statement
and

in~

subsequent developments, 'that Renault cancelled its

contract with Kaiser-Fraser of Israel because Arab

.'

.

:

..

'·

9lacounter-Boycott Body Formed," Jewis~ Observer and
Middle ~ Review, August 23, 19 57, p. 5 •.
·'

9~Haboker, Israel, August 8, 1957, quoted in periodical
Bulletin No. 73, Cairo, November 4, 1957, p. 7, Palestine
office, League of Ar a b States.

....

•... ·; L,. ... ~:

,

•a

~r· J .

't '

..

'·

.

·~
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nuthorities would not permit Renault to operate in Arabia
so long as

Renau~t

continued to do business in Israel.

The

following is an excerpt from the aenault statement of
October 22, 1959:
1.

1 t is true a.fte.r many year.s 1 ·COntrary ,to
the rules and practice, that certain states
prohibited the admission of merchandise
to proceed from firms executing industrial
contract \'lith enterprises situated in the
StA.te of Israel.

2.

Regie Renault being unable, despite
repeated efforts, to bring an~nd to this
situ~tion of f act, found, as have numerous
French and for~ign businesses before her,
it had to malte nn unltsilling choice for an
enterprise e~9lu~ively industrial and
co~mercial .
This choice is obviously not
.•.t'
motivated- by political considerations .
'rhe sale criterion of the number of
vehicles depends, in the final analysis, on
the number of jobs Rssured to F'rcnch
workers."?3 .
.

11

On November JO, 1959, the Lebanese Embassy in Paris
disclosed that Renault ' had
to the Arab League
. submitted
.
Boycott Office i ts proposed letter of cancellation before
it was sent to

Kaiser -Frase~

later, the u. A. R.

in I srael .

newsp~per, §1.

Several days

Akhbar , reported Renault

had begun negotiations to establish an auto a ssembly plant
'

in Egypt, and on December 7, the Gairo Hadio reported
Henault had committed itself to an investment of :l;i22,400,000
for construqtion of a new plant .

..
j

93Quoted in J e-;,ti s h Comrum1 i1;y Jiel8ti~ns Council of
Gre nt Philadelp
' his Th~ Ara b Bo:r co~ t :; :1d.· Renault , February
26 J 1960.
J
-·---

.·

96
It seems reasonable that Renault cancelled its
contract with Kaiser-Fraser of Israel in order to be removed
from the black-list of the Arab League Boycott Office and
that Renault ha s also yielded to the Ar ab Boycott.
The Israeli counter-boycott \'Jas put into operation
on several occasions.
Company.

One example is that of the Shell Oil

The American Jewish War Veteran's Organization

ca lled for a boycott of that company.94

British Jews, led

by Zionists, boycotted Shell gasoline stations.
One maneuver often used \'las to pull into a station,
wait until an attendant arrived to give service, and then
pull away \'lith 'a critical remark .95

'rhis campai gn against

the Shell Oil Company was dropped bY. the Israeli Foreign
Ministry in a decision t a ken following assurance from
Shell that it ·would
Israel.96

i~sure

"desirable e sources of oil for

Another example of the operation of the Israeli

counter-boycott is that of the Brown and Williamson Tobacco
Company, which stopped sales of its cigarette, Viceroy , i n
Israel after Arab pre s sures boycotted by Jewish organizations
in the United St ates, Viceroy sales dropped by almost 19
94Jewish Observer, A~gust ' 2), 1957, p . 6.
95Herut, Israel, August 2, 1957, quoted in Periodical
Bulletin ;~o. 73, Nove mber 4, 195'7, Palestine office, League
of Arab States.
96Jewish Observer, ·s eptember 20, 1957, p . - 9.

per cent 1r.. 19.58, c::.ccorC.inG to a r eport on sc.les of a ll
cigarette compa nics.97

Jewi~h sources a~tributed thi&

sisnificc:mt dc crca.se primarily to the eff'ecti\eness of

....

their boycott.

Implementation of the counter-boycott, however, has
been hampere d by witle disagreement arnont,; the Isr aelis themselves as to "Vlhcther this type of policy should. be
employecl and wl!e.t the gouls of the countez:-boycott should
be.

First of all, when tl)e 1;>oycott commi ttee was formed,

trere seemed to

be no official unanimity about the counter-

•.

boycott policy.

TI1e Finance Ministry seemed to be

strongly opposed to it.98

I

•

'

Furthermore, \the n the Jew·ish Agency decided• to boycott Shell Oil Company in the United State s, the Israeli
Embassy in \!ashington protested such action.

The Embassy

advised Jerusalem to recousider the advisability of a
publicity campaign.

As a result, the Foreign ninistry

has now, to all intent s F..nd purposes, called off the
)

campa1gn.99

..

..

97The Hatiomil J·e~ish Post and Opinion, Hew l:ork,
Vol. XIV, No. 19, January 2, 1959.

1957,

98Jewish Observer and ~iddle ~Review, hUgust 23,
p.

6.

·.

99Je~Iish Observer and f1iddle East Review 11 Israel
Drops Anti-~hell Campaign:" September 20, 1957, p. 17.

98
~oun~er-boyoott .

Confusion about the intentions of the

elsa was indicated in the statements of some Israeli leaders
Although the boycott of ,firms acquiescing _to Arab pressures
was distinctly named as an area of activity for the counterboycott (see footnote .No. 91), the: chai.r•man of the counter•

I

boycott committee, Heir Grossman,.

h~d

this to

s~y:

The Government of .Israel and the Jewish Agency
have never thought of bOycotting the /~rab
countrles .or the foreign companies who submit
to the Arab boycott. Our purpose is to fight
the Arab aggressi~n · in the economic field by .
reasoning and by expia1n1ng our attitude, uncovering
the ~idden goals of the :Arab boycott and
exposing the efforts of the boycott liaison
officerf! wl}o stir-up. q~.~ exploit the rnc1al ,
and religious prejudices. If necessery, \'10
take further steps to CO!ilba~ the Arab ·.boycott. 0

wp-6

One of'

leaders

to be

the institution ot

~n

th~

the main re r..t sons for differences among Israeli ·

\

a . cotn1tcr-~oycott

appears

belief that such measures would give the Arabs

the impress ion that

.

~heir

'"

:-. .

boycott was succeeding.

Hoporting that "-Powe~ful voices both in the 1'reasury and
the !i"orcign t1iuistry" hnd spoken again st the counter-

.
.
boycott, "The Jewish Observer wrote: "It would serve only

-

-

to give the Arab boycott both an . undes_erved standing and
unnecessary publicity. 11 101

lOOLnmerhav (newspaper) '.L'el Aviv, ;.;eptecber 5, 1957,
quoted in 'periodical B'ulle tin No. 7J, (.;Hiro, t;ovember 4, 19 5'7,
p. 10; Palestine Office, League of ~rab ~tates.
,. .. .
,

•

lOlJewish Obse rver, loc. cit.

• ... l ,!.

,

I

.
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Although Israelis disagree on using n counter-boycott,
they have ngreed upon attEloking the Arab. boycott through u

publicity cflmpaign in the ini"ormation mcdin .

centecs on three main points:

'l'his campaign

('

1.

·rhe Arab boycott is an act of a .;gression.

2.

7he, Arab boycott is. a result of racial and

.I

religious prejudices activated by the
establishment
).

r;f ·

the State of Israel, and

Protests to public opinion , governments and
institutions againot the Ara b boycott.

One good

in i•'ebruary
cun

Je\ii ~h

ex£~mple

19~8

b:i the

of this ca.r.1pa i g.n 1G a report pu\ 1l ished.
yrer~ idcntu

of Seventee n l1a jor /.meri-

orga niza.tiona under the title • . "Bigotry and. Black-

mai l - u report on the

r~rab

boycott."

It s tated in part:

The Arab boycot t a ctivities encroach
upon the elementary American freedom to ;
trade, to invest v.nd to trDve l ••• k t:ericAn
citizens in this coun!,ry are questioned
about their relizian by consulor &!!d
diplomatic officials of the Arab states.
American Jews a re denied beca use of their
religion the privilei;;Cs g ran ted to uon- ,

-

.

.. • .. 1 ~

.1:'

Jews • ••

In the broadest sew:se , the Ar a b boycott,
therefore, constitutes politica l and
economic n6g ression. By crea ting and maint a ining tension , of neer-~1ar , corttinue lly
thx-c aten 1ng world pelice and stability.

,.
·'
I· •

iJhile the boycott lasts, interests vital
6o Ai!ler ios a r e j e•'>iJO.rd.ize ct. On polit.icel
economic and mor al grounds, it must therefore
be resiste d ~Y t l~e Vn1 ted .~ t a. t c s Government
by t}perieo.n bus iness ntld by Americnn public
opinihn . • ·.1 -·'

. . .. '
..
.
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In J rmuary 7, 1960 ,1 ·the same org£mization released a
nell report to the Yiddish and English Jewish .l-'r ess which

sta ted:

.1:

.. ,

.'l

~he .i\rab League boycott--" is a form of
political and economic a~gression that creates
and maintains tension 1in the Ni ddl:e ~:ast. By
keep lng the Biddle East in a sta te of near
we.r, the ·boyco t;t is a continuing threat to
world peace. So long as the boycot t lasts,
interests vital to i~merioa are jeopardized.

Because ·the boycott imposes unneceosary
expenditures and enonomic losses upon all the
countries of the - Middle East, it subverts the
purpos es of the United 3tates economic
assistance and makes the Middle East more :
dependent upon s uch /.meri can a id. Ar ab Leggue
economic warfare therefore pla ce s unnecessary
an1. a <lditio:nal burdens upon the Ame rican
t a xpa yer.
It· is t herefore su~es ted that the evils of
the Arab boycott s hould be exposed.102
Confronted with this campaign, the League of ,\rab
St a tes initiated a counte r-publicity campai gn in which it
endea vored to answer the Zionist charges .

Against the first

point, the Arabs argued tha t the boycott was a defensive
measure known and accepted as such in internationa l law,
and practiced in the same way by t he Uni ted
Comu1Unis t China.

~ tates

against

Secondly, !;he Lea6ue denied r acial or

religious prejudice agd i ns t the Jews.

.

La stly, it asserted

that the boycott does not constitute -a thre a t to international

.. ,

cor;u;1ercia l cooperc t ion.

'i'he "boycott was based, it asse rted,

102Conference of Pre s idents of Major America~ Jewish
Organizations, January 7, 1960.

101
on the natural right of everybody to choose the individual or
company with which he wishes to do business.lOJ
'r here is an interesting point of

~peculation

on v1hy,

after beginr1ing a publicity campaign protesting the Arab boycott, Israel has not filed a complaint at the United Nations.
One strong hypothesis is that the United States

~ould

stop

Israel before she reached the United t,;ations because the
complaint would reflect upon the America n nnd &ationalist
Chinese blockade of Red China.

Then, too, if the complaint

did reach the United Nations, there is the strong possibility
that the Afro-Asian block in the General Assembly would
enough votes to defeat it.l04

h~ve

An editorial in the Herut

party newspaper indicates that while some Israelis have
considered filing

~ uch

a complaint at the United Na tions,

they have failed to act, not because
• • • this measure wa s doomed to failure because
of the Soviet veto in the Security Council, or
because the Arabs would be able to get the necessary votes to throw out the Israeli complaint
if the case should go to the Assembly, but because
the Arabs are not expected to change their
position.l0.5

lOJBulletin of Secretary-General of ~ League, December
12, 19.58, pp. 8-10.
~gypt,

9.

lO~he Ministry of Education, ~ is ~Zionism, Cairo,
19.56, p. 192.

10.5Arab League Bulletin, No. 73, November 4, 19.57, p.
(Excerpt from Herut, August 2, 19.57.)

v· .

u

t , )

~

.

•

.
...

,·

.!' -~
I

.·

(

'.

\

.,

'·'
I•

CHAPTER

..

1

'

VIII

CONTR.OVERSIAL VIEW POIN'£S ON THE
·'"' '

EFFECTIVENE.S!:i OF THE BOYCOTT

! • ' ...

t; - ..

j , •

.... '

....
'I.

' '

..
l

...

l

• ·- ·

...

..

'

CHAPTEll

Vlll

COli'.i'ROVERSlAL .VlB)rJPOlN'f S

ON THB

E FFECT IVENE5 ~· 0F

THE

BOYCOT~

In order to see more clearly the broad picture of the
effects of the Arab boycott, the investigator found that most

..

evaluations of, or information on, such effects differ
I

s ubsta ntially according to whet.her the sources ere Israeli or
r.rabic.

It will be helpful, prior to presenting conclusions ,

to discuss first, the Ar a b views on the effectiveness of their

.

.

action and -secondly, the Israeli views.
firab sources recognize that it is not easy to inflict a
serious blow on the Israeli economy as

lon~

a s Israel can fill

the gap in her balance of trade with specia l fw1ds pouring in
from abroad.

Hevertheless, Arabs do believe that the -boycott

has already had its effect on the economic life of Israel,
and has realized a t least part of its i ntended aim.

In 1957

t.he Main Office. of the 13oycott re po r t ed t o .he 3ecre t a ry
General or the Arab League that

thE~

.

Israe l i economy wus in a

state of chaos. 'Prices, the office reported, were going up • •
flationing an<;t controls dominated the ma rket.

An acute

I

shortage of raw materia ls existed, the foreign trade deficit
was widening;· and .the foreign exchange position of the state

104
was becoming preca i•ious.

There ha d been a uharp de cline in

the va lue of Israeli carrency, a nd a

of oon ficlence in

lo~:.;

. .

the stability ot' the cconomy.l06

In their evaluation of the eff-aces of tho boyco t t. oa
I sra el, the i\ r a bs men tioned ·the follO\.i ing:

,. . .

Despite a ll the efforts made by the l srnel1
Governmeut to 'tif;hten their imports and to

enc&urage nnd promote exports, lsrael has
·fulled to ba l ance · her foreign trade.

't he

following table ' shows the impor~s ·and exports
arid the annual deficit in her trade ba lance
in millions of aollars between 1949 and 19,56.

...

BALANCE OP 1l'HADE

:~··

(Millions of dollars)

Excess of .iml2orts

1:x 12ort& &
Ye nr

Imports

1949

2.5J .1

29.7

1950

298.8

)6~9

379.8
320.7

19.51
19.52

..

..

l~e-e.x:gor~s

~ r~xport§,

'.

22).4107
r

46.8

~

. .- ,.

4,5.6

,. .

.

261.9
\,."

.

JJJ.O
27.5.Jl08

,(

106£!. Heport 2ll .!ill£ nctivit!.Y.. of .till£ J1a. Jn orr~~ vf the
Boycott £2!: itlli. second half Q( 1.2.iQ., the Secretary Geuera l
J~cport

to the 2'/th oe :.Jslon of

l·lnrch 19.5?, pp. J65.;.J66.

th~

council vf the Ar a b League •

· )

107~acts and 1<'16-ureo, Israel;_O~fice of Infor-L1a t1on, New
York, 19)5, p. J9 .

l08lsrael, Governme nt Year~. 571.5 (1954), p. 228.
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1953

286.9

19.54

J76.6

19.56

.529.J
2.

.. ,.
..

..

59.6

I..

227.3109

•

lJ.5.8

240.8

171.)

358 • 0110

1'he value of Israeli currency has suffered
a sharp decline resulting in inflation.

In

1949, the Israeli pound was equivalent to ;
~~2 . 8.5;

the British pound sterling or
it is equivalent to $0.85.

today

This is a sign which

indicates that increase .in the value of Israeli
exports is only theoretical.

~peaking

in terms of

Israeli currency, the value of exports has increased considerably becuase of the decline in
value of the Israeli pound.

In terms of

volume, however, there was only a slight

.

..

increase •
).

The Arab success in stopping the flow of raw
materials and foodstuffs to Israel from
neighboring Arab countries has led to a
sharp rise in the cost of living.
tripled between 19.51 and 19.58 .

It almost

fhe following

table shows this gradual rise:
l

I

109Israel, Government Year Book, {1957}, p. · lJ7.
llOisrael. Government Year Hook, 1718, (19.57), p. 108 .
• J

t ...

-~
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CONSUMERS !

Plil~E

INDEX .

,

\ . ! (. ..

.

{Base: September 19.51-lOO h .
September

4.

'~>• 'c.

-

.

. 1.5J

1952 .. ,

..

19.53 .

. 196.

19.5!+

220

19.5.5

233

19..56

248

19.57

264111

• 1

August

.

t

\

.

10.0 '

19.51

'~

.. •

Due to the ' continuing rise in the cost of
I

living, the Israeli Government employees and
workers continued to deroand higher wages.

'£he

Israeli press' regularly contains items about
strikes and demonstrations by workers.

Some

factories have had to lay off part of their
o

._

-

'"

I

•

(

l abor force beca use of the high cost of
.'
production and the l a ck of a ready market

.

\

(.;

(,,

to absorb their products. Other factories
,
or business ventures had to close down
entirety.

..

•

4..

•

!

This had led to an increase in une mploymen t
with wf.lich neither the.

.:.,

,.· .

g~;ve rnmeJ?.t ·

--- -·
•

.....I.

nor.

th~

..

- •• ·- ".,

•i

, '.

::1..'

llls tatistical Bulletin of ' Isra el (Englis h Summa.cy ),

Septembe~ ! 9.58, Vol. IX, No. 9;-p.

338. ·
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labor agencies could cope.

As is often the case,

this crisis · in unemployment resulted 'in,tsooial

problems.

tlany unemployed workers resorted· .to

pilfering, robbing, and

v~rious

other crimes.

The

statisU:1oal abstracts and the reports of the

l4iniatry of' · Police reveal and incroasing rate of
crime in :rsrael.ll2· · .

.5.

. ,:.

The Arab pressure on foreign companies which
invested in 'Israel, established brE111ches there,

or helped ' in any ·way to build the Israeli
economy, led to the \'11 thdra.wal of many companie s
and changes in the plans of others.ll3
Tightening of boycott rules concerninG foreign passenger
and cargo ships, not · allowing them to stop in an Arab country
if they had visited Israel, led to ·a rise in the costs of
shipping to and from Israel.

In a report, "Bigotry and Black-

mail,• the presidents ot major Jewish organizations in the
United States acknowledged this fact a nd re ported that the
American b':xport Lines, for example, must at a considerable

expenditure of time · and money operate a separate Middle East
service to the Israeli ·ports of Haifa and Tel Aviv.
1

:,

:::J , n ·

'

.

11 2! Uepor~ 2n ~ ~ctivity of ~ tlllln Office 2( ~
Arab Boycott for~~~ of~. 1~e Jccretary General's
~eport to the Council 2£ the Arab Lengue During ~ ~ ·
Session, ~arch 1957, pp. 36.5-5667
- . w.

7-8.

113 Ib1d., for the first half of 19.57, August 1957, pp.

--
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c~ne

ln the

for~ign, air

of

suffered the sama trouple.

.IJ!

line companies, Israel

sp~ te

of its strategic loca tion

between three continents, l!:urope, Asia and•.Africa, lsraol could
not achieve her hope of 9eCOflling · t l1e international a ir crossroad between the East and West.

The Ara b countries forbade

.

planes using Israeli airports from flying over Arab , territory
•

or from receiving flight

..
I

4

•

or services from Arab

.1nformat.i~;m

..

sources.
Turning to the Israeli
investigator found that
subject of the

the~

are almost entirely silent on the

boycott.

Ar~b

unfortunately, ·the

sou~ces,

Even the most painstaking

studies of Israeli publications, both official and unofficial,
fails to reveal Israeli's own assessment of the boycott and
its effects.

T~is

paucity .of relevant material could

possibly be inte~preted as indicating at least some effective-

. .:

ne s s of the boycott.
It is

poss~ble,

however, . to get a certain idea of their

views from ~r.ticles arid editorials, in Israel's leading newspapers • .

!..

' ~

...'

,. ,,

The Arab boycott is generally pictured by most Israelis
as a failure.

In their opinion, the boycott has not had

serious ef(ects on the
its aim~
the .March

A

good

. ·'

economy and has not accomplished

exampl~ -of this

2?, ~ 1959

East Review.

~Israeli

view
I

issue of the Jewish

point is provided in
• I:
Observer~ ~iddle

--

109

In 'the article descrlb1ng the boycott as the "Arab
,•·. . "
Double-Edged Weapon," Dav'id' R'o'a sone 1 wrote: ·
The use

of

economic boycott in' the Arab
however, h~s not generally been so
sporadic and incidental.; It has been a conl..:
sistent instrument of policy. Surprisingly, it
has ' nQt been d1rect~d only against Israel, but
also to a growing degree, against Hestern
countries. · As far as Israel is concerned, the
Arab boyoott, when fir~t initiated had damaging
effects ' on the Jewish economy in Palestine,
but even since 1948 the losses which have been
inflicted upon the Arab countries in exportproceeds, in customs nnd oil revenues have
far o~twcighed the losses incurred by lsrael.ll4
\~orld,

G. l1eran asserts in an article entitled,

11

The Arab

Boycott and ito Econocic Effect,•
•• :that after the creation of the state of
Israel, the Arab states lost more e.s a result of
the boycott than did Israel. Israel exports
mainly citrus and diamonds, t i<<JO products for
which the ; rab countries hardly provide a
market. li'or its industrial exports, on the
other hand, if -they were competitive at \'IOrld
prices, Israel would always find Westorn Europe
hard-currency· marltets more lucrative.
Only in one aspect· might the Arab boycott
prove damaging to Israel. If Israel succeeds in
diverting its export trade more and more from
Europe to Asia anu Africa, it may find the
blockade of its regular shipping services,
through the Suez Canal and through the ati~rnative
route · or the Gulf of Elath, tbreatening. .,

·114navid Hocsone, "Boycott Arab's Double-Edged "o·l eapon,"
Jewish Observer ~ M iddle ~Review, Herch 27, 1959, p. lJ.
•

••

1

f

115G. Heron, n~he Arab Boycott's and its Economic
Effects," ~ Economic Quarterll• Vol. !, No. ), J anuary, 1954.
.'
.. . ' .
.•
I

'."-~

''
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A more recent Israeli definition of the failure of the
boycott was given in a new qook published by the Israel
, .
Office of Information in New York which stated:
;

..

I

•

t

~

t.

•

Nearly eleven years of Arab economic warfare
have not checked Israel's economy and ·the possibility of its infliction of vital injury 1~
slight. It has been a weapon of spite rather
than a serious danger., to Israel development. In
some respe·c ts rt has even served to stimulate
Israel's economic progress by encouraging a
larger agricultural output and th"e discovery of new
export markets.
The boycott aggravates and perpetuates
tension, and flouts the principles of economic
international, intercourse. It endangers the peace
of the world,· because boy~ott and blockade are
instruments of warfare.llo
I

,

I

Despite this prevailing view of the boycott, some
economic

expe~ts'

voices are heard now and then acknow-

ledging the effects of ·the boycott.
title, ncan

Israe~

wrote that:

11

In an article under the

Support Herself? 11 1 ... an

The Arab boycott

cos~

~sraeli,

Oded Remla,

the Israeli economy an

estimated $40 million ann~~lly, in ~ he~~ier . ~xpens~s for
importing oil, in denial

o~ . nea~by

supply, .and
in _other ways •. ull7
.•
•

..."

market aqd souPces of
,.

t

...

('

Yet other ~ Israelis deny an economic effect of the boy-

.

"

cott, while admitting a political one.
\,,

...

..•

f

.. ' -

... ,

I

I

Haboker, an , ~sra.eli

,

\

116Israel Office of Information, Israel's Strugr,le £2!:
Peace, Marstin Press, Inc., New York, 1960, p. 87.
117ocie&· Remla, Can ·.Israel -suppoZ:t rierself?, Commentary,
flew York, ~~ovember- 19.56, ! P·. 4J3.
' ·

111
daily newspaper asserted that:
..•
Tho Jewish exoerts in Israel think that the saccess
ot the r rab bOycott has more political repercussions
than economic, and whatever success it accomplishes
will ha ve a direct effect on the pos s1b111t1es of
concludin~ pence between Israel a nd the Ar a b States.ll8
While it is difficult to estimate .the exa ct damage
inflicted upon Israeli economic life, it can hardly be denied
that the boycott hns resulted in definite problems for Israel.
For example:
1.

l . ..

•'

Israel and world Zionism \'lcre upset by the
effects of the Arab boycott to the extent tha t, •
after years of publicly ignoring it, · they have
discussed it in public and in several Jewish

'J

conventions with the resulting decision to
initiate a counter .. boycott. · l·.•
2.

·.'

'

I

i''

Emigra tion from Israel has gradually increa sed,
startling the Israelis who never expected such
a reversal.

Ea rly in 1957 the Israeli Director of

Immigration Affairs announced that:

The number of Jews who arrived in Israel since
the e stablishment of the State was 8)5,000 at the
end or 1956. ' There are 50,000 Jews in lsrael who

did not apply for lsraeli citizenship, preferring
to keep their original nationalities. These Jews
represent J per cent of the popula tion of Israel.
The : ~umber ~ of Jews who emigrated from Israel

ll~Haboker, Israel. Sepce~ber 5, 1957, cited by
Perio~ical ..~lletin !2,. ll, ~ ovember 4, : ~9.5? 1 p.· 5, Palestine
Office1 League of Arab States. ·
·'

.. .

:

.

.

::::

~·.

. ...

... a ....... _

112

since the establishm'!nt of the ~ tate until the end
of 1956 is about 70,090,- or 8.5 per ceut , of the

Jews who 1mmigra ted t;o Is~ae l. It is to . be u gted
tha t the number of newcomers to -Israel who emigr ated
is only 5 pe~ cent of the total number
em1grru1ts .
'I'his means that most of those who left l.sruel urc
original inhabitant~ and this is very disturbing.ll9

9r

'The emi.grntion of such a ,large number of, Jews from
Israel. and eapec1nlly from amo!l.(; . the "Sabras," that is, Jews

native to the oountPy, appears to be due to dissat isfaction

with economic and social conditions.
sources, this

.
situation prompted the

According to Arab
Iaraelil.Government on

January 1, 1959, to · appropriate a special fund for extennive
I

research on t the immigration problem to be undertaken by a
group of experts from the Hebrew University in Jex•usalem.l20
).

That the . Israeli economy is in a shaky

condition appears clearly in the information
and. statistics released by the Government ·of

Israel in official documents

~nd

in other .

\.'

, Zionist· publications.

An Israeli economic

expert, in the Jewish Obsel"Ver. analyzing a
United llationa

l~eport,

~The

Developmen t of

fl,anufaeturing .lndustry 1n Egypt, ..Israel, and
Turkey, • wrote :

.'

•

t

•.•

.'

'rhere is no longer any s urprise when i nte rnat ional

experts, confoonted with the fact s of Israe l's

~-

ll~noport of 1bQ. !:iecre t a ry. GeHerl;11 Q[ ~ ~ .... eague

~ _ the Counc1l· !B
~oJ-264.
'•

1ts 27th Sess1on, . Ca1ro, March, 19.57. pp.
·

· ·'

·

120 Bulletin 2( tna Main Office 2£ the Boycott, No. 207/5 9,
Dcuna.scus, January 2.5, 19.59.

llJ

economic life i- throw up their hands in horror
and proclaim it impossible. r• study carried out by
the S tanford Research Institute in 1955 concluded
that labour productivity in Israel is perhaps
only about 50 per cent of tha t in many industrial
nations and probably in the vicinity of 25 per.
cent of productivity in the United ~ ta tes.
At the same time, wages in Israel are in some
cases higher than in several more industrialized
couijtries, including Ge rmany. Average hourly
earnings in manufacturing during 1954 were 48 cents
in Israel, 40 cents in Ge rmany, )8 in France, 27 in
-Turkey, and 23 in Japan. Profits , on the othe r hand,
are low according to the United Nations report. The
situation in Israel has become an increas ingly
serious problem. The Stanford Resea rch Institute
stated: 'There is only a modest amount of business
profits in the a ggrega te in the vlhole of Israel. •
This suggests that many industria l enterprises are
probably suffering losses.l21
In a 1956 survey of Israel, the

co~nittee

of Foreign

Affa irs in the House of Re presentative s reporte d that:
At present, Israel produce s 70 pe r cent of
her food. Israel can not yet pay her own way. It
can only hope to mainta in itself fully if it ca n
develop its industry and export the products of
its skill and technology to other na tions, without
the economic boycott which restrict s her ut the
prese nt time.l22
It must be noted t hat the re were some factors which
helped the Arab boycott and played an important role in
weakening the Israeli economy.

In no way related to the

boycott apparatus, these factors included the strain of

121Jewish Observer and Middle Ea st Review, February 16,
1959, p. 13.
1 2284th Congress, 2nd Session, Union Ca lendar No_ 588,
House Re port No. 168), lleport of the Study Mission to Europe.

--
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providing for large numbers , of i mmi g rants and the great
expenditures resulting from
standing army.

1.

a·~.:-policy

of maintaining 1a large

These .are discussed in detail below. · .

Jewish

to Israe l:

i~nigration

that 934,000 J.ewish immigrants
n.

• 1

It is estamated
ar~ived

in

Israel between f1ay 15, 1948, and t!le end of

1958.
. ·

· ··

This mass

immigration ~ required

substantial increase ia

a

government ~ spen~ing,

the more so since jobs had to be provided for
the

ne~1comers,

means .of their

few of .whom arrived with e.ny
o~m.

For all the generosity of

\Wrld Jewry, contributions .from abroad did not '
. · cover this cost.

Consequently, a large portion

of .the country's income, which should have

J

·,. been utilized. on building the economy, was
spent .on immigrants. ·
2.

~

I

The Israeli .policy of maintaining a l a rge
standing army: The defense budget, the total
of \'lhich has always .. been secret, and I s raeli
labpr power were both drained by a standing
army with large reserves constantly called
out for drill or emergencies, and by the time
devoted to guard duty i .n the border settlements.
Military expenditures , the refore , took a

. ..

.

!

.
l

.rurth~~~ tot~l _of th~ country's resources.

..,

•

11.5

On the other hana.. there

·11a::,

one f tsctor which bolstered

the Israeli . 'eeor,omy and th~ireby hiudared the effectiveness of
·this faco t r wa~ the flow of cs pitel from

the Arab boycott.

' .

;

abroad~

-. •

"

I

~

" ., 1 a

,&

•

"'. I

Isrti.el •s· balnnce of trAde
mill1on.l2J

1

>

I

Uh0)fl3

an annual deficit of ~350

£hiu gup .is mad~ up partially by s ;pecial funds

1

from abroad totaling $26.5 to ~ 280 millioa. a year.

'l'h.ese funds

include German reparations, German r(?.Gtit.utl on paymer1t to

Jewif.>h families, annuul donation!3 from

Je \~S abro~d ,

;;;ale

or

State of Israel 2onds abroad, c.ud remittances from · foreign
Jews to relabives .in Israel .

l'ha tota l irlflux of capital in

1

the periou bet~cen 194~-1957 amounted to $2.5 b1llion.l 24

l)espite the cons1etel'able, but limited,
the

.~rabs

succes~

which

have realized · ir.. thelr boycott of Isr.c!iel, tho Arab

League auffered a r..umber or failures which aided Israel.
First of sll , ·the

: Arabs ~ fuiled

to

oto~

the flow of funds

1n aid\ and donations to Iurnel, especially f1•om the United

States.

1

1~gardlesG

of .ull tho

pre ~ sure

they applied to stop

this·, tho flow of capital continued.

.'

. .. s econdly, they {ailed to prevent lest Germcuy from
payin~

lsrl1el

~822

million in

reparation~

Jlnd sub.ut-a ntial

. t • . ..

l 23new York Times, January 15, 1959, ft!srael 1 G Budget

Raises Outlays.•

124oeoffery !) • .Paul "Fucing Is-rael' s Economic Chulle.age. a
Jev1ah Obsen•ver Md ~liddle East Review, Februarv 6, 19~9 ,·· pp.
14-lS.
"'
~
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amounts in restitution payments to Jewish
..

Thirdly, ,
the

Gulf ··~f

...

f

Araps

t~e

••

fa} l~~

Aqaba. ~ay, thus

to

prev~nt

unti~

...

the Arabs... Through Elath, Israel

Isreel from using

the Israelis tp.

~na.bling

southern . port .of Elath, , wh.ich

familie~.

us~

their

then had been blockaded by
for the first time, able

\'IU D,

to contact the Asian and Africe.n countries from whom she acquired

II

some of her needs in raw materials in excha nge for her mRnuf actured goods.
A primary r ea son for the se f a ilures ma y be the influence
of world Zionism and its strong grip on most media of
information, as \'lell a s the pres sure Zionists could exert on
international and local political a nd economic ins titutions •

.

Such Zionist pressure is quite understandable s ince, if the
ti.rabs should succeed in their boycott, .it would be a matter
'

of life or death for Israel; Therefore, Zion ists have
..
fought with grea t determination.
Future prospects for any major changes in the boycott
I

,

•

appear to be negligible.

.

.

The tendency among the

today is to tighten the boycott.

A~ab

states

The Arab League ha s

instructed the main office ' of the boycott to speed up
measures- in every respect.
As a

r~sult

'
I
of this stricter
applica tion of boycott ..
J

measures, the United Arab llepublic, which used to forbi~
..
'
·' .
foreign vessels_:· from carrying only petroleum or other
s tra§egic

.good~ ., through

the Suez Canal

to,

or from, Israel

..

--
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embarked upon a policy of nlso '·f'orbiuding all or arty Israeli

goods in forai&n ve osels from us ing the canal.

During

February ana i·! e.rch, 19.59, Onited Arab Republic authorities
detained. three foreign ves.s els a.au seized their cargoes of

Israel cement, potash, and sera}) iron.l2.5
Tile success or failure of the J~rab ooyco-c t in' the future

will depend, of !oours<:!, upon the continued :.:tupport. whlch
Israel received from abroad,
development of tho Middle

anu

E~s t.

upon t he ~eneral political

-

Addrosaing a Jqapai }Ja.rty meeting 1 the former Israeli

Commander-in-chief.

~'larned tht~t:

Israel's hone.rmooa Kith t:.he Wast mignt be nearing
its end.

The facts

ha ve to be f etced tha t a
~es t and the ,\rabs ' \il:1. S
likely to happen and the Israelis htid to be
prepa-red for consequently harciel.~ times and
dangerous situat1ons.l26
n0\1/

repproachment between l;he

Some of Israel's external uources of income a r e ~.. lreudy

exhausted.

'l"'hese include the $1J5 million in export-import

bank l .o ans,

the ~ $100

~15

million in sterling bal ances, anu

million in foreign securities held by Israelis.l27
major sources on which Israe l is

no~>~

relying

~orne other

to fiu~ncc

i2.5~ York :.i'i rnes , Harch 27, 1959, "Isrue~ ~ecs

Los tl in

Suez Ship Bun. •

J26'! Duye..n l::ar~1.s: 'Jest Nuy 'i'urn," Jewish Observe£ !!ill!.

Hiuule Eao t HeviC\i, Docambe.r 19, 1958, p. 12.
~ e•·z

1.270ded tio rJlu, "Cnn l~rae l ...iup port :-iersc lf '?," t;omr.1ea t.a o,
York, rlovembe.r, - 1956, pp. 4J8-4J9. •
':

-..--
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economic development would
number of years.
declining from
to

no ~longer be av~ilable

Grru1ts from tho Unite d

~85

~ tu tes

within a

have been

1955

million in 1952 to $J6.6 million in

$7.5 million in 1959.

In the next fisc a l yea r no United

States aid is planned at all since Israel has be en removed
from the Unite d St ates foreign aid progru~.l28
Israel of

~ 822

million in goods and

se rv~ces

Del iverie s to

i s d ue to

expire by 1967, depending on the r ate of a nnual del iveries.
i1ore than one -half of t he t ot <:.l has a l ready been used.
For t he Arabs., the boyco tt .i..r.; j ust one <ispect of the
Arab-Israeli conflict.

I'hey i ntend t o contine.e i t until a

solution is reuched for the v;h ole Palestine lJroblera.
Arab people the boycott has as sumed

~

For the

symbol ic aspect of the

struggle between them and the I sraeliG.

'J?hey i nte nd to force

Israel to accept the Un ited Na tions re solutions t·Thich she first
accepted but has continuous ly re pudi a t ed , and

~o

insure the

repatriation of t.hof:le ;,rab refugees who '.·mnt to r eturn "to their
homes with f a ir compensation t o those ·Nho wish to settle
elsewhere.
If, as pre sently seems the case, Isr aeli sources of
economic aid continue to G.windle, the Arab

boyco~t

\.' /ill

undoubtedly loom as an e ven lir euter de t e rren t to Isr aeli
economic growth ru1d surv i va l.

I t is possible

tha ~

Israe l may

12 8" Directed United St ates Help to Israel .Ending,"

York Time s , April

5, 1959.

I .-·--

~
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have to limit or stop furthe l:" J ewish i moi gration for 'l.•!ant of
resources to provide for them.

'lb 0n ,

i f no new s ources of

economic aid, which IsrDel needs for ba l ancing her budget,
are (orthcoming, she mis ht well be forced to meet Ar a b decands
in order to e nd the boycott. ·However-, only the future holds
an answer to such s peculations .

I
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SUI1!t;AHY AUD CONCLUSION

purpose of this thesis wns to describe anti discuss

the .\rab boycott of Isra el inclu.iillti its goals, its structure
and its operations, in add! tion to the Israeli and Zionist

reaction to it.
In order to unders t and ·t.his problem it 1m s thought

advisable to intrQduce the firs t

t\iO

chapters in the thesis

with a brief accoW1t of the recent hiBtory of Pa lestine

ana

the Arab Lcague, . discussing the mnin cauaes of t;hc conflict
I'

between the .\rabs and the Jews.
In addition to the Balfour

D~claral;ion

of 1917, the

Palestine .Haudate ,,..,;;;.s d iscus sed , the l a tter be ing the uirect
consequence of the former •

. • In regard to the Arab League (the regional organization
of the Arab States) the author discus sed the Alexandria
Conference of 1944, which delineated the outlines of the Arab
League.

'file pact of the League wa s signed in C.:::.iro on the

22n March, 1945, by the revrescnta tive of seve n !1ra b S t e!tes .
'fhe machinery of the Leabrue consists of a council, a number

or special committees arA u permanent secretariat.

On the

--

1.(.;2
I

council each s t u te has one vote .

r·t~ funct.i.ons lucl;...clt;s mediaz1cn of d l s j:.utcs

/,rab Capitalo.

•

betl-tcen any of che
the League.
of

'.i.'ht;, co:.mcil [il.S.Y meet in any

•I

~ague

states or with a countr,1 out::; ide

'.lhe council has a 1>011 clcal com.-·nit tee 'cons i &ting

Foreign l'linistE;.rs of

'

.

~he

..
J..rab

!:.tote~.;.

11e;noorship in the

League is ope r.~." ~o a.n:y i nde.tJ&llilaut :~rab St<::te.
...

r:.....

)

three u;.d. four a.iscus sed. tl:c

Chaptert~
t.

the

i. r:~b

1Joycot t a.t:td

tt o

b~ycott \·I as

•

vf t he

bo;tt;O \; t;

Je\.'1~

iu

l 'ule~t;lr..c ,

undho~-=

I~

end its godls ?

·.ihy d.o t he
ls:.~uc l?

measure ubt.:.i.ast
l

• \,.

.

I

•

.\r~ou

:'h~
_,.,.,

r egu!"C.. it. as a defens ive

l:.or:;.eli refu$al t o

\

•

Uni t ed

!~atilCJns

ret~n

of the million 1\r u"b rofu3ee f..;

original

llesolui.iun of 19!.:.·7

~....tJ.-:1

i rnplc ~:crit

the ·

•

t heir .i:'~eventillJ the

frur.~

Palestine to their

'

were the ma jor causou of t h-3 :.r .;b boycott.

hvtilC! B

In

thi~, the Ar a.b :t~tcs . ~ilvisugcd the ccoaom1c

the lig ht or
;·'I

'

boycott of Isruel as t heonl:r defensive neu.surc a g.:-1ins t

Israeli expans ion.
r.l..' he two stages tha t the boycoct' i·o.n t hl'uUGh .we.::-e
'

j)resented.
•

.

The firt.>t stage , \'lith limited gouls f.1nd means ,

l \

.

we s begun in 191}5 during t he dayG of the Sri t ish
•....

~

r

I

•

'""

~lhich

t,:

!.X.

II

It

,.,.

was directed t o i;;urda the Jet'IS of Palestine.
... _11

~i;.illdtl te.

?ne second stage •

f

was ac tuully only a con;;.iriua ti'->n -if t :a:J fir~:; t , \ia n
o

,_)

l

I

I

directed· a.ga inti t lSl"f!e l.
"

f~\,..·

·:

Chap ter five and six de a lt with the boycott of I s rael
a.ntl its opera tion.
.

"i:Jtl .. F' {

•

I' ----

12J
upon the prohibition of
r-u

'-

-~

all ~commercia l
•

-

rela tions between Iprael

and the member sta tes of the Ar ab Le ague.

This applied to t he

importing of a griculturol goo.d s or a ny manufa ctured or other
f

':

•

I

commodities from Israel to the Ar a b countries and to the
1

';

l

•

export to Israel of raw materials and foods.
~

·~

forms the

boy~ott
.. , , .,

were the

'.fhe different

took were described in great detail.

~o

i

meth q~s
•

I

J

individual Arab

applied by the . Ara b i.e ague in genera l and

.

"''- ••

~tates

.

in particula r.

Chapters seven and eibht dealt with the Isra eli r e a ction
to the boycott and the controversia l viewpoint as to the
effectiveness of the boycott.

He cognizing that an exclus ively

Arab verdict might be biased, a number of Israeli source s
and records were consulted and quoted from a nd the
pertinence of such material was rema rked upon.
g iven on the Israeli counte r-boycott.

Da t a were a lso

While the Israe li and

Arab assessments of t he Arab Boycott Movemement obviously
g reatly differ, the da t a supplied should enable the reade r
to form a f airly accura te picture of the ma in i s sue .
The conclusion dra wn from t he extensive materia l contained in this thesis indicates that the Ar a b boycott has
been indeed effective.

While at the present t i me it is difficult

to estimate the exact da mage infl icted upon Israeli economic
life, there would seem no doubt t ha t the boycott created
some gr a ve economic proble ms for Israel.

Mention was a lso

made of severa l partial f a ilures on the pa rt of the Ar a b
boycott-organizers.

----
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Since the boycott still continues, it is obviously impos sible to give a final verdict on its success or f a ilure.

It

is, however, hoped that the deta iled discussion of the en tire
boycott operation, with all the relevant pol~tical and economic data, may enable the student of the present t e nsions in
the Middle East gain a much clearer comprehension of the
forces primarily responsible for these tensions.
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